Improving the Management of Blood Exposure Accidents in the Netherlands. by Wijk, P.T.L. van
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/74658
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
Improving the Management of
Blood Exposure Accidents
in The Netherlands
Paul van Wijk
Im
proving the M
anagem
ent of B
lood Exposure A
ccidents in The N
etherlands
Paul van W
ijk
 Improving the Management of 
Blood Exposure Accidents 
in The Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied van de Medische Wetenschappen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proefschrift 
 
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor 
aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen 
op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof. mr. S.C.J.J. Kortmann, 
volgens besluit van het College van Decanen 
in het openbaar te verdedigen op woensdag 18 november 2009 
om 13.30 uur precies 
 
 
door 
 
 
Paul Theodorus Liesbeth van Wijk - Nijssen 
 
 
 
 
geboren op 26 februari 1962 
te Beesel 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
Promotor:    Prof. dr. A. Voss 
Copromotor:   Dr. P.M. Schneeberger, Jeroen Bosch Ziekenhuis, 's Hertogenbosch. 
 
Manuscriptcommissie:   Prof dr. K. van de Velde 
Prof dr. J. Galema 
Dr. J. van Steenbergen, Centrum Infectieziektenbestrijding, 
Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu, Bilthoven. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cover: Fokko van de Woude 
ISBN: 9789081402422 
 
2009 
Drukkerij Tielen Boxtel 
 
Dit publicatie van dit proefschrift werd mede mogelijk gemaakt door financiële steun van ArboNed, 
Braun Medical bv, BD Medical, GlaxoSmithKline, Smiths Medical en Vygon NL bv. 
  
 
 
 
  
 
CONTENTS 
 
 
Chapter one Introduction and outline 5 
 
 
Chapter two Occupational blood exposure accidents 
  in the Netherlands 13 
 
Chapter three Differences between hospital and  
 community acquired blood exposure incidents 
 revealed by a regional expert counselling centre. 29 
 
Chapter four Quality control for handling  
 of accidental blood exposures 41 
 
Chapter five Three-Year Prospective Study to Improve 
 the Management of Blood-Exposure Incidents 55 
 
Chapter six Variation in interpretation and counselling of 
 blood exposure incidents by  
 different medical practitioners 71 
 
Chapter seven Inadequate infrastructure for follow-up 
 after needle-stick injuries in the Netherlands 85 
 
Chapter eight Impact of a new guideline for blood exposure 
 incidents in the Netherlands 97 
 
Chapter nine Discussion 113 
 
 Summary in English 117 
 
 Nederlandse samenvatting 123 
 
 Dankwoord 129 
 
 Curriculum vitae 131 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voor mijn ouders. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction and outline 
 
  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
6
BLOOD EXPOSURE INCIDENTS, RISKS AND BACKGROUND 
 
“Blood” exposure incidents include all incidents in which transmission of 
human blood or body fluids are possible. Such incidents are for example: 
accidental needle sticks or cuts with used medical devices, human bites or 
scratches and accidental splashes with human blood. [1-8] Sexual assaults can, 
apart from the risk of sexually transmitted diseases, also cause the same “blood” 
(body fluids) exposure risk. [9, 10] 
 
The main risk of blood exposure incidents is the transmission of hepatitis B 
virus (HBV), hepatitis C virus (HCV), and/or the human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV) [11-13], even though transmission of other diseases has been 
reported incidentally. [14] An infection with one of these viruses mentioned 
could result in a chronic infectious disease, with a prolonged disease related 
burden for the patient, who conversely may become a continuous source for 
further transmission. [2, 15-19] 
 
Blood exposure incidents can occur in various settings, both occupational and 
non-occupational (community), although the majority of documented blood 
exposure incidents occurred in hospitals. [5, 7, 8, 20-25] Incidents in other 
settings have also been reported, such as in home healthcare settings, in the 
police force or in non-occupational settings such as needle stick injuries in 
children playing in public places. [26-33] 
 
 
BLOOD EXPOSURE INCIDENTS, ASSESSMENT AND COUNSELLING 
 
Based on the kind of injury and the estimated amount of blood transmitted, 
blood exposure incidents can be categorised into three major categories: high-
risk incidents, which pose a risk for transmission of HBV, HCV and HIV; low-
risk incidents, which only pose a risk for HBV transmission, and ‘no risk’, for 
all cases that pose no risk for transmission of any blood-borne viruses. 
The specific nature of each of the three viruses, their viability, the risk of 
transmission and the different kind of post-exposure measures, make assessing 
and handling blood exposure incidents a complex matter. Moreover, because 
post exposition medication has to be administered within a certain time period to 
be effective, there is also a limited time frame for the counsellor to act.  Apart 
from counselling aimed at prevention of transmission, providing care and 
sometimes reduction of anxiety for the exposed individuals are important 
supportive measures to be taken. [35, 36] 
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Counsellors can refer to several guidelines when assessing the risk of a 
blood exposure incident. [11, 12, 34] In 2007, a new national guideline was 
published in the Netherlands, replacing all previous national guidelines. [13] 
The potential infection with a blood-borne virus, and the potential long-
term sequel of a blood exposure incident, can cause anxiety and stress for the 
exposed. Lack of knowledge about transmission risks can even increase this 
fear. The opposite also occurs: lack of knowledge and indifference can lead to 
the underestimation of the actual risk, with the result of not reporting the 
incident to an expert. [8, 37-39] 
Individuals who are exposed do not always know who to address for 
counselling. [40] Counsellors’ lacking experience may also cause under-, or, 
over-treatment of the exposed and can cause additional anxiety. 
 
 
BLOOD EXPOSURE INCIDENTS, COUNSELLING CENTRE AND 
QUALITY CONTROL 
 
Due to a lack of national surveillance, there are no exact data of blood exposure 
incidents in the Netherlands. On the other hand, national occupational laws 
demand that employers take measures to protect their employees from suffering 
a blood exposure incident and prevent them from getting infected by blood-
borne viruses. [41] In the Netherlands hepatitis B vaccination is not included in 
the national vaccination programme; however, risk-groups are encouraged to get 
vaccinated. 
 
In 2003, a new approach to counselling blood exposure incidents was introduced 
in the north-eastern region of the Dutch province of North Brabant. After 
introducing this regional protocol, a regional expert counselling centre was 
established to handle all blood exposure incidents in the entire region. The main 
idea behind this initiative was that for some counsellors, who do not counsel 
blood exposure incidents on a regular basis, a new protocol would be too 
complex and time-consuming. Instead, centralising the care for these patients 
would be more helpful. Parties who were involved were the two general 
hospitals in the region (Jeroen Bosch Hospital and Bernhoven Hospital), the 
municipal health service (GGD Hart voor Brabant), the regional association for 
general practitioners (District Huisartsen Vereniging), the home healthcare 
organisation (Thuiszorg ‘s-Hertogenbosch) and several occupational health 
practitioners. 
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Infection control practitioners from both hospitals staffed the expert centre 
and handled all incoming calls 24 hours a day, with a backup of medical 
microbiologists. All blood exposure incidents from inside as well as outside 
hospitals were handled according to a strict protocol. Logistic arrangements 
such as assistance with blood withdrawal, administration of medication and 
follow-up arrangements, had to be made with emergency departments, 
laboratory services and occupational healthcare services. 
 
 
AIMS AND OUTLINE OF THIS THESIS 
 
The aim of this thesis was to evaluate the impact of the expert centre for blood 
exposure incidents on different quality aspects. In order to address this topic, the 
following questions were formulated: 
 What is the impact of a regional expert counselling centre on the reporting 
and handling of blood exposure incidents in this region? 
 Which quality parameters are needed to assess the effect of improvement 
of handling of blood exposure incidents? 
 Can handling and risk estimation of blood exposure incidents be 
standardised? 
 In what way can the handling of blood exposure incidents be improved by 
using the currently available protocol? 
 
These items are addressed in the following chapters: 
In Chapter 2, the available national data about occurrence and the consequences 
of occupational blood exposure accidents in the Netherlands were summarised, 
in order to set out a prevention policy. Costs of handling blood exposure 
accidents were calculated. 
The performance of the regional expert counselling centre and the results 
of the first year, with regard to the differences between hospital and community 
blood exposure incidents, are given in Chapter 3. 
In Chapter 4, the protocol of risk classification of blood exposure incidents used 
by the expert centre is revealed by studying the adherence to this protocol by the 
expert centre. 
In a three-year prospective study, different aspects of the management of 
blood exposure incidents, such as the time it took for exposed individuals to 
report the incident, the time required to perform a human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV) test for the source individual when needed, occurrence of injuries, 
hepatitis B (HBV) vaccination status of exposed individuals and the quality 
improvement made by the expert centre are revealed in Chapter 5. 
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Different (medical) backgrounds of the counsellors and the use of non-
standardised protocols may cause variation in interpretation and counselling of 
blood exposure incidents. Results of a survey among counsellors addressing this 
problem are given in Chapter 6. 
For adequate handling of blood exposure incidents, a logistic 
infrastructure for follow-up is needed. We studied the availability of different 
aspects of this infrastructure in the Netherlands. The results are described in 
Chapter 7. 
Finally, in Chapter 8, the impact of the new guideline for blood exposure 
incidents is described. By reassigning all cases that were registered during one 
year in accordance with the new guideline’s risk categories, the impact on costs 
and risk estimation were assessed. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Background 
To evaluate prevention policies and data on the incidence and associated medical 
costs of occupational blood exposure accidents in the Netherlands. 
 
Methods 
Descriptive analysis of blood exposure accidents and risk estimates for 
occupational groups. Costs of handling accidents were calculated. 
 
Results 
Each year, an estimated 13,000-15,000 blood exposure accidents are reported in 
the Netherlands, 95% in occupational settings. HBV vaccination is offered free of 
charge only to people in risk groups, the seroprevalence of hepatitis B (HBV), 
hepatitis C (HCV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is low and few 
infections are related to blood exposure accidents. 
High-risk accidents occur mainly in hospitals. In nursing homes and home care 
settings, the majority of the accidents are low-risk. Limited data are available 
about occurrence of accidents in other occupational groups. 
Associated medical costs from occupational blood exposure accidents are mainly 
determined by the initial risk management. 
 
Conclusions 
Accidents must be managed effectively to prevent infection and reduce anxiety in 
injured employees. While strategies to reduce HCV and HIV infection should be 
primarily aimed at reducing the occurrence of high-risk accidents, vaccination can 
prevent HBV infection and cut the costs of handling low-risk accidents. The 
implementation of vaccination strategies, safe working policies and the proper use 
of safe equipment should be monitored better. 
 
KEY WORDS: needle stick accident; blood exposure; occupational health; 
prevention; costs. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
15 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Background : Blood exposure accidents are accidents in which human blood or 
other infectious body fluids of a person enter the body of another by piercing, 
cutting, splashing or biting. These accidents can result in infection with hepatitis B 
virus (HBV), hepatitis C virus (HCV) and Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
(HIV). [1,2] To avoid these infections, preventive measures and an adequate 
response to reported blood exposure accidents are necessary. [1,2] 
Primary prevention of blood exposure accidents involves safe working 
procedures. Employers are obliged to assess work places in order to determine the 
risk of infection by biological agents (Article 4.85 of the Working Conditions 
Decree). [3] In order to prevent such risks, preventive measures, such as safety 
equipment, have to be implemented. Moreover, HBV vaccination has to be offered 
to any employee who is moderately at risk of becoming infected with hepatitis B. 
If, despite preventive measures, an accident does happen, employers must provide 
adequate medical assistance in order to minimize the risk of infection. To facilitate 
the management of blood exposure accidents, the National Institute for Public 
Health and the Environment (RIVM) published a ‘National Guideline on Blood 
exposure Accidents’. [4] In this guideline, blood exposure accidents are qualified 
as either high-risk or low-risk. In a high-risk accident a relatively large quantity of 
blood is possibly transferred, requiring measures to prevent the transmission of 
HBV and HIV and diagnostic follow-up for HCV infection in the injured. In a 
low-risk accident, the possible amount of blood transmitted is minimal, in which 
case only measures to prevent infection of HBV are required. 
Adequate handling of blood exposure accidents requires reliable reporting 
of the accident by the victim. However, international research shows that only half 
of the blood exposure accidents are reported. [5] Medical professionals in 
particular have the tendency to trivialise these accidents. On the other hand, 
reactions to blood exposure accidents can also be highly emotional and fearful, 
leading to serious psychological problems and long-term sick leave. [6,7] 
Because there is no central registration of blood exposure accidents in the 
Netherlands, there is no understanding of the exact scale of the problem. In order 
to formulate policy, proper knowledge is needed on the amount and nature of 
blood exposure accidents in the different work settings. The objective of this study 
was to summarize the current available knowledge. This may serve as a basis for 
recommendations for policy making and practice in the different work settings. 
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METHODS 
 
Extent of occupational blood exposure accidents in the Netherlands 
National publications and Internet sources were used to outline the extent of blood 
exposure accidents in the Netherlands. 
Infections due to blood exposure accidents 
Published data concerning HBV, HCV and HIV surveillance in the Netherlands 
were used to describe the incidence of these infections in the Dutch community 
and the number of these infections caused by blood exposure accidents.8,9 
Furthermore, unpublished data from the national surveillance system on infectious 
diseases (Osiris) were used. 
Blood exposure accidents per occupational branch 
Numbers of employees in the different occupational sectors were collected via 
websites of the different occupational branches and data from the National Office 
of Statistics (CBS). 
 
Data on incidence and nature of blood exposure accidents in different occupational 
settings were collected using records of local hospitals and Municipal Health 
Services and publications on blood exposure accidents in different Dutch 
populations. The same sources were used to gather data on the HBV immunization 
status of employees in different occupational settings. Based on the collected data 
and comparable international studies, a risk assessment was formulated for each 
occupational group. 
 
Costs 
The medical costs of blood exposure accidents are those incurred for risk-
assessment, post-exposure-prophylaxis for HBV and HIV, and diagnosis and early 
treatment of HCV. We calculated direct costs per blood exposure accident, 
assuming that an adequate response to the accident gives the victim full protection 
against infection with HBV or HIV. Because this is not possible for HCV, we 
calculated the costs of treating HCV infection for one year after such an accident, 
based on the probability of infection actually occurring. 
For high-risk accidents we calculated the costs of initial risk assessment, the 
costs of post-exposure-prophylaxis HBV multiplied by the risk of a HBV positive 
source, the costs of post-exposure-prophylaxis for HIV, multiplied by risk for a 
HIV positive source and the costs of early diagnosis and treatment of HCV for one 
year [10,11] multiplied by risk HCV positive source and risk of infection (3%). 
[12] 
For low risk accidents, we calculated the costs of risk assessment, the costs of 
post-exposure-prophylaxis of HBV multiplied by risk of a HBV positive source. 
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The costs of risk assessment of accidents were calculated using actual prices of 
assessment, laboratory tests and costs of first treatment. These were added to the 
cost of treatment of infection with HBV, HCV and HIV, according to the risk in 
the corresponding risk category. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Extent of the problem in the Netherlands 
Extrapolations of data from registers kept by Municipal Health Services and 
hospitals showed that 13,000-15,000 accidents are reported each year. [13] Most 
blood exposure accidents in the Netherlands occur in the healthcare sector. In the 
northeast of Noord-Brabant, for example, this sector accounted for 85% of them 
between 2003 and 2005. [14] In addition, 10% of reports are received from the 
police, fire fighting forces and other non-medical sectors and 5% were non-
occupational. 
Infections caused by blood exposure accidents 
Hepatitis B: About 1,800 cases of hepatitis B infections are reported in the 
Netherlands each year, most of them resulting from sexual contact or transmission 
of the virus from mother to child. An average of ten to twenty cases annually is 
reported as being caused by a blood exposure accident. [15] 
Hepatitis C: Until 2003, both acute and chronic hepatitis C infections were 
registered in the Netherlands. The incidence was about 500 cases a year, most of 
them caused by intravenous drug use or previous blood transfusions. Since 2003 
only acute cases of hepatitis C infections have been registered, about 30 cases a 
year. [8] In the Netherlands, only two cases of hepatitis C infections resulting from 
blood exposure accidents have been documented. [16,17] Occasionally, cases on 
acute hepatitis C infections are considered presumably to be caused by a blood 
exposure accident. In recent years, this has occurred on average once a year 
(Osiris, unpublished data). 
HIV: In 2005, 1,200 new HIV infections were reported, the majority of 
them caused by sexual contact. [18] To our knowledge, no case of HIV infection 
has ever been reported that was the result of a blood exposure accident in the 
Netherlands. Data on worldwide numbers of HIV infections caused in this way are 
relatively limited. [19] 
 
Blood exposure accidents in different work branches (Table 1) 
Hospitals: About half of all occupational blood exposure accidents in the 
Netherlands, an estimated 6,500 accidents annually, occur in hospitals. Van Wijk 
et al. found that 10 accidents per 100 FTEs per year occurred in their hospital. [20] 
Statistics reveal that many of these accidents are likely to occur in operating 
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theatres. [21] Here and in emergency wards, accidents are often categorized as 
high-risk. Relatively many high-risk accidents also occur in hospital laboratories 
and in dialysis wards. In absolute numbers, most accidents take place in nursing 
wards, although these often carry a low risk. [20,22] Hospital employees indirectly 
involved with patient care (e.g. cleaning staff) may also be victims of blood 
exposure accidents. [20] (Table 1) 
 
Nursing and care homes, home care: About 25% of all blood exposure accidents 
occur in nursing and care homes and the home care sector. [20] Reported 
accidents are mainly low-risk, a high proportion involving insulin injections and 
lances to determine blood sugar levels in diabetes patients. [20,23] Nursing and 
care staff run the highest risks of sustaining a blood exposure accident; in this 
group, one to two blood exposure accidents are reported for every 100 employees 
yearly. [20] Vaccination levels for hepatitis B in this group of employees vary 
from 40% to 65%, those for larger institutions being higher than for smaller ones. 
[14,23] 
Mental healthcare: special needs institutions, including addiction treatment 
centres: The number of blood exposure accidents reported by mental care 
institutions is limited, i.e. 2.5% of all such accidents, most of these being low-risk. 
[20] Behavioural problems and aggression can result in accidents involving biting 
and scratching. Furthermore, employees in mental care institutions often work 
with patients who have an increased risk of carrying HBV, e.g. patients with 
Down syndrome or patients who have an increased risk of carrying HBV, HCV or 
HIV, such as intravenous drug users. [18,24] It is plausible that employees in 
direct contact with these patients are at risk of sustaining blood exposure 
accidents, although there are no known figures for this. Levels of vaccination for 
employees are not optimal. [14] 
 
Dental practices: About 3% of all blood exposure accidents in the Netherlands 
occur in dental practices. [14,23] Activities that involve risk are the administering 
of injections and, to a lesser degree, cleaning dental instruments. The incidence of 
blood exposure accidents in the dental profession is not properly documented. The 
level of hepatitis B vaccinations in this sector appears to be high. [25] 
 
Midwives’ practices: The incidence of blood exposure accidents in midwives’ 
practices is low. No exact figures are known, either about the total number of 
blood exposure accidents or the number of blood exposure accidents per FTE. 
Specific accidents in this sector are ones involving splashing during childbirth and 
blood exposure accidents that occur during episiotomies and stitching. [26] The 
current level of vaccination among midwives is unknown. 
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General Practitioners’ practices: No exact data are available about the total 
number of blood exposure accidents in these practices or the number of such 
accidents per employee. [14] It is expected that at least some of these accidents are 
allegedly dealt with by the practices themselves rather than being registered. 
Given the nature of the work, accidents that occur in GP practices would be 
mainly low-risk. [14] The level of vaccination among GPs and doctors’ assistants 
does not appear to be optimal. [25] 
 
Other medical settings: Although accidental blood exposures may occur in other 
healthcare setting such as occupational health and safety services, vaccination 
centres for travellers, Municipal Health Services and pharmacies, these 
organisations are not listed separately in the registers, meaning that there are no 
figures available about the incidence of blood exposure accidents.  
 
Occupational risks in non-medical sectors 
Police: The police account for about 2% of all blood exposure incidents that occur 
in the Netherlands. [14] Exposure is mainly the result of biting incidents (43%) 
and the blood of arrestees coming into contact with the eyes, mouth or open 
wounds of officers (36%). Only in 10% of cases are incidents caused by a needle 
or other sharp object. [27] Aggression is often involved and officers often have to 
deal with persons who are at an increased risk of carrying HBV, HCV or HIV. [4] 
It is plausible that officers deployed in the streets and those involved with arrests 
have an increased risk of being exposed to blood, although no figures are 
available. The probability of a police officer having such an accident is estimated 
at 0.5 to 1% per year. [27] 
Penitentiaries: The total number of blood exposure accidents in penitentiaries 
appears to be similar to that sustained by the police. [14] Also conceivable is that 
the nature of these accidents is comparable, but no research has been done on this. 
[4] The probability of a penitentiary employee having such an accident is 
estimated at about 1% per year. [14] 
 
Fire fighting forces: No data are available in the Netherlands about blood exposure 
accidents among fire fighters. Accidents are reported occasionally, most of them 
involving resuscitation. International studies do not demonstrate any higher 
incidence of hepatitis B infections in fire fighters than among the general 
population. [28,29] 
 
Cleaning staff and public gardening: About 2% of all blood exposure accidents 
occur in these sectors, affecting cleaning personnel in particular. [14] Work sites 
themselves have a decisive influence on the risk of such accidents occurring. 
Blood exposure accidents occur to a large extent in healthcare institutions and, to a 
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lesser extent, in public facilities. Typical for such accidents is that the needles in 
question have often been discarded, i.e. are part of waste matter, meaning that the 
source is nearly always unknown. This produces heightened anxiety – particularly 
when accidents occur in public facilities – given the possibility that the source 
may belong to a high risk group for HIV. It appears that responses to blood 
exposure accidents and the availability of vaccination against hepatitis B are not 
yet optimal in these working sectors. [30] 
 
Body care (pedicure, manicure, beauty salons, piercings): Although sharp 
instruments are applied to bodies in this sector, thus creating the possibility of 
blood exposure accidents occurring, such accidents are hardly ever reported. [14] 
 
Costs of blood exposure accidents 
Basic assumptions were made on the risk of positive sources for HBV, HCV and 
HIV in the Dutch population, these are 0.2%, 0.25%, and 0.05% respectively 
[8,9,18], and the risk of transmission of one of these viruses with a high-risk 
accident with a positive source, these were estimated on 30%, 3% and 0.3%, 
respectively. [4,12] For low-risk accidents involving a vaccinated person, it is 
sufficient to assess the accident. No further measures are necessary. The costs of a 
single consultation are estimated at € 65. Assessing a low-risk accident involving 
an unvaccinated person is slightly more complicated. Following the initial 
assessment, measures are required to prevent hepatitis B infection. In practice, this 
almost always means vaccination followed by blood testing, resulting in of € 240. 
The estimated costs of a high-risk accident sustained by a vaccinated person 
are € 317.40, if the source cooperates with testing. This includes the costs of 
assessing the accident and laboratory testing of the source (€310) and, taking into 
account the probability of the source being HIV-positive, the cost of PEP to 
prevent HIV infection (€2.65) and, taking into account the probability of the 
source being HCV- positive, the cost of follow-up testing for HCV (€ 2.50) and, if 
necessary, the treatment of HCV (€ 2.25). If the source does not cooperate or is 
unknown, the costs are considerably higher because follow-up testing for HCV 
and HIV is required twice. Moreover, if the source belongs to a high risk group for 
HIV, PEP also has to be initiated. For an unvaccinated victim there is also the cost 
of preventing HBV infection. If the source cooperates this is € 25.60, for 
laboratory testing. If not, or if the source is unknown or HBV positive, it is € 300, 
for administering HBIG and vaccination. (Table 2) 
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DISCUSSION 
 
General/methods 
As The Netherlands has no central system for registering blood exposure 
accidents, data on blood exposure accidents within most occupational sectors, 
except for hospitals, are limited. Different sources had to be used to estimate 
occurrence and risks involved. However, not all these sources provided reliable or 
complete data. Still, the estimates from specific occupational setting may be 
reliable, especially since data from the international literature point to the same 
conclusions. [5,19,26,29] 
 
Extent and Infections 
Extrapolation of data by the National Hepatitis Centre show that 13,000-16,000 
blood exposure accidents occur in the Netherlands each year. These data are based 
on several regional registrations, that contain additional registrations of non-
occupational blood exposure accidents. However, underreporting of accidents is 
not taken into account. In a study of Van Gemert et al. [6], 81% of the interviewed 
health care workers (HCW) said always to report an accident and believed 55% of 
their colleagues to report their accidents. In an unpublished Belgian study of Leens 
et al., in an annual check-up by the occupational health practitioner, employees 
were interviewed how often they were injured that year. Based on these numbers, 
it was concluded that 50% of all blood exposure accidents were not reported. 
Thus, the real incidence of accidents in the Netherlands could be at least twice as 
high. 
The prevalence of blood born viruses in the Dutch population is low. In the 
mid nineteen eighties, standard hepatitis B vaccination was introduced for persons 
enrolled in health care. As a result, the majority of people (aside from perhaps 
older employees) who are at risk of sustaining blood exposure accidents are 
protected against hepatitis B. Before the vaccination policy was introduced, blood 
exposure accidents resulted in a higher incidence of transmission of HBV. [31] 
Only a few cases of occupational HBV infections are reported each year, 
even fewer HCV infections and no occupational HIV infection has ever been 
reported in the Netherlands. Therefore, the overall risk of developing an infection 
after a blood exposure accident appears to be very low. This is in contrast with 
other countries with a higher prevalence, where more infections after blood 
exposure accidents have been reported. [5] 
Despite the still low risk of infection, preventive measures should be 
continued and improved where possible. 
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Occupational branches 
The majority of and most high-risk blood exposure accidents reported in the 
Netherlands occur in the hospitals. Research of exposures in Dutch hospitals show 
that these data are comparable with studies in several other countries. [5,12,33] 
Hepatitis B vaccination levels in the hospitals are high. Given the high incidence 
of high-risk accidents, low threshold reporting and risk-assessment facilities are 
necessary 24/7. From the perspective of prevention, it is important that every 
hospital registers and regularly evaluates all blood exposure accidents, including 
descriptive epidemiologic data such as setting, profession of the HCW, and 
reasons that lead to the accident. In addition to providing general information 
about blood exposure accidents, studies have shown that such registers can be 
used to issue specific instructions for safer working practices, modify work 
organisation and, where necessary, introduce safe equipment. [12,34] Periodic 
inspections of responses to accidents and analyses of accidents, with appropriate 
measures taken as a result, are recommended. 
 
A quarter of all blood exposure accidents occur in nursing and care homes and in 
the home care sector. These are mostly low-risk accidents. Given the high number 
of blood exposure accidents with insulin injections and blood sugar needles, 
specific information about the associated risks is indicated. Literature suggests that 
the devices used for blood sugar testing could be improved with regard to 
safety.[23] Furthermore, the hepatitis B vaccination level in this sector could be 
improved. This would reduce future costs of blood exposure accidents, since low-
risk accidents sustained by vaccinated employees would warrant no further 
response. 
 
In the mental healthcare sector as well as the police and penitentiaries, blood 
exposure accidents, like in other countries are often a result of aggression. [36] 
Since employees in these sectors are often in close contact with sources that 
belong to high-risk groups for HBV, HCV and HIV infection [8,16,18], it is of 
upmost importance that these sectors receive proper information about the risk of 
infection (with HIV in particular) following a blood exposure accident and 
vaccination. Furthermore, any initial response to any such accident should also 
include attention to the aggression to which the victim has been exposed. [7] 
Although employees working in mental institutions and addicts are encouraged to 
be vaccinated against hepatitis B, levels of vaccination in these sectors are not yet 
optimal. [14] Vaccination of patients themselves can also help reduce the risk of 
employees being infected with the hepatitis B virus. [36] 
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Data about blood exposure accidents in dental, midwives’, and general 
practitioners’ practices in the Netherlands are limited. Given the specific kinds of  
work done in these sectors, a better understanding is needed about the nature and 
circumstances of blood exposure accidents, so that information about safe working 
practices and work organisation can be properly tailored to these professions. 
International studies in these sectors may help in finding solutions. [26] Also, 
because of the sometimes hazardous actions required in these professions, 
employees should all be vaccinated, not only for their own protection but also to 
prevent their patients becoming infected. [37] 
 
In other areas of employment in which blood exposure accidents may occur, it is 
important that more data are gathered in order to properly identify the risks and, 
based on this, offer hepatitis B vaccination. Moreover, employees should be 
conscious of the risks of blood exposure accidents and know what to do if such an 
accident occurs. 
 
Costs 
We calculated a single blood exposure accident may cost between €65 and €620, 
assumed the source is tested for blood-borne diseases. Because blood exposure 
accidents result in relatively few infections, the resulting medical costs are mostly 
determined by the initial response and assessment. This was also found in other 
studies. [38] Because circumstances and prices may differ, these costs are difficult 
to compare with other international studies. In our calculations, we also assumed 
HBV vaccination and PEP to be 100% effective, but this may not be the case. 
However, preventive vaccination makes dealing with low-risk accidents much 
simpler and thus cheaper. Conversely, high-risk accidents require no less than a 
comprehensive initial assessment including laboratory testing, followed if required 
by additional measures. Only the prevention of these high risk blood exposure 
accidents – through safe working procedures and/or the use of safety systems – 
can bring about substantial cost savings. 
Not included in the cost calculations is the employment time loss because of visits 
to doctors to deal with blood exposure accidents and incapacity for work as a 
result of HBV, HCV or HIV infection. Loss of employment time seems to be 
caused largely because of the delay of the initial response and assessment to 
accidents. Research has shown it is possible to improve the quality of handling 
accidents and therefore to minimize the time needed to assess these accidents. [14] 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
Occupational blood exposure accidents can result in HBV, HCV or HIV infection. 
An estimated thirteen to fifteen thousand of such accidents are reported in the 
Netherlands every year. The actual number is probably twice as high. Although 
the number of infections resulting from blood exposure accidents in the country is 
now relatively low, continued alertness to the prevention and adequate 
management of blood exposure accidents is still crucial. Apart from prevention of 
infection also the preservation from anxiety and uncertainty on the part of 
employees is important. 
The occurrence and impact of blood exposure accidents should be further studied 
in several occupational sectors. 
 
In order to prevent health damage through blood exposure accidents, proper 
information about safe working practices is extremely important. Hepatitis B can 
be prevented effectively through vaccination. This would eliminate the need for 
any response to low-risk accidents. As to high-risk accidents, the risk of infection 
with HCV and HIV can only be further reduced by lowering the occurrence of 
such accidents. This could be achieved by training skills, organising work properly 
and using safer equipment. The impact of safe working devices in hospitals in the 
Netherlands should be further studied. 
In all sectors it should be ascertained that timely and adequate attention is being 
paid to the above, if necessary followed by the measures indicated.  
Adequate HBV vaccination strategies, together with 24/7 available reporting 
facilities, could reduce unnecessary delay and costs. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Objective 
One year (2003) regional analysis of all blood exposure incidents from hospitals 
as well as from the community. 
 
Design: Establishment of an easily accessible regional expert counselling centre, 
operating 24 hours a day, for all accidental blood exposures. Tasks of the centre 
were: to register incoming calls, to inform and counsel the victim, to assess the 
risk of the incident, and to provide a plan of further actions, including prophylactic 
measures. 
 
Setting 
A Dutch region (Northeast Brabant) with 500,000 inhabitants and two major 
hospitals (1786 beds). 
 
Results 
A total of 454 incidents (1.2 per day) were recorded. Only half of the incidents 
occurred in the hospital setting (n=234), whereas the others (n=220) took place in 
community site. Nearly all (95%, n=432) incidents occurred during work, and 
most of them (84%, n=385) were related to health care activities. In the hospital 
setting injuries occurred with physicians (13%), nursing staff (45%), Operating 
room (OR) staff (13%), ancillary (18%), others (10%). In the community setting 
incidents took place among: healthcare workers (48%), detention and police 
officers (10%), civilians (10%), general practitioners/dentists and their staff (8%), 
cleaning staff (4%) and work-related incidents not falling into any of the above 
categories (7%). More low risk incidents took place outside the hospital (87% vs. 
68% in hospital), while high-risk incidents predominantly occurred within the 
hospital setting (23% vs. 6%). Hepatitis-B immunisation rate was significantly 
lower in victims form the community than in those working in hospitals (38% vs. 
96%). Reports from incidents in the community setting were delayed. 
 
Conclusions 
Incidents that expose individuals to blood-borne pathogens occur equally frequent 
in the hospital- and non-hospital (community) setting. Therefore,  a regional 
expert counselling centre, accessible around-the-clock, for all types of blood 
exposure incidents, is needed. Blood-exposure prevention programs should aim at 
a reduction of high-risk incidents within hospitals, and at increasing the awareness 
for vaccination and early reporting within the community setting. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Exposure to blood poses a small but significant risk of transmission of blood-
borne pathogens including hepatitis B virus (HBV), hepatitis C virus (HCV) and 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). [1] Apart from the risk of contracting an 
infection such an incident may cause anxiety and stress among the victims for 
which adequate counselling is needed. [2] 
Most data on accidental blood exposure are from hospital settings. [1,3,4] The 
mean rate of reported incidents is estimated 4/100 full time equivalent (FTE) 
health care worker (HCW) per year, or 10.3 and 8.8 per 100 FTE for medical and 
nursing staff, respectively. [1,4,5] However blood-exposure incidents may also 
occur in health-care settings not related to hospitals, as well as in settings not 
related to health care at all. [6,7] Data on the incidence of non-hospital related and 
community-acquired incidents are scarce. [8] 
Timely reporting of an incident to an experienced health care provider will allow 
the administration of proper preventive measures and counselling. Assessing the 
risk of transmission of blood-borne pathogens is a complex matter depending on 
variables such as, the type of injury, the amount of blood transmitted, the 
infectiousness of the source, and the level of protective antibodies in the “victim”. 
The success of prophylactic measures depends on the interval between the incident 
and it's administration. In collaboration with all health care providers and public 
health services in our region, we have established a regional expert counselling 
centre for blood exposure incidents. 
 
 
MATERIAL AND METHODS 
 
Regional expert counselling centre: A regional expert counselling centre for 
blood-exposure incidents was established in collaboration with health care 
providers, (medical specialist and general practitioners), the public health 
department and the occupational health department. The centre operates 24 hours 
a day and is easily accessible by telephone. The centre is staffed by specifically 
trained infection control practitioners with back up from infectious disease 
specialists. It registers all incoming calls, provides risk assessment of the incident, 
informs and counsels the victim and provides a plan of action to start prophylactic 
measurements. Reports and follow up are given to the general practitioner or 
occupational health care officer. All registered data were reassessed on a weekly 
basis with one of the infectious disease specialists. Flaws in the protocol and 
breaches in handling of the protocol were discussed with the infection control 
practitioners. 
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Population and region: The expert counselling centre provides services to two 
hospitals with a total amount of 1786 hospital beds (928 occupied beds per year) 
employing a total of 2207 FTE's of HCW per year. Furthermore the centre serves a 
semi rural region with one major city above 100,000 inhabitants (1250km2) with 
an overall population of 500,000 inhabitants. In the community there are estimated 
a total amount of 6500 FTE's employees per year in home health care settings and 
nursing homes. There are estimated 260 general practitioners, 230 dentists and a 
total of 2355 FTE police workers and prison officers. 
Information about the counselling centre throughout the entire region was given 
through flyers, newspaper articles and hospital seminars on a regular basis during 
the last three months of 2002 and the beginning of 2003. 
 
Risk assessment: The risk assessment of blood borne transmissions was divided in 
three major categories, high risk percutaneous incident with hollow bore, blood-
filled needles, low risk after percutaneous incident with a negligible amount of 
blood and no risk for an incident where no blood or body fluids was involved or 
the skin remained intact. [9] Other types of incidents, including human bites and 
scratches, spillage onto mucous membranes (mouth, eyes, non-intact skin) and 
sexual incidents are gauged according to above mentioned algorithm. Minute 
amounts of blood were considered to pose low risk whereas considerable amounts 
of blood was considered high-risk incidents. 
 
Counselling: All victims were counselled and assisted in having laboratory tests 
performed, as well as obtaining informed consent from possible sources to be 
tested. Medication was given in the emergency rooms of one of the two hospitals.  
Registration and reporting: Each reported incident was registered on a 
standardized form. All incidents were analysed and assessed for adherence to the 
standard protocol on a weekly basis within the group of infection control 
practitioners and a infectious disease specialist/medical microbiologist. Reports 
were sent to the patient’s general practitioners describing the nature of the incident 
and follow-up that was needed. The following data were registered per incident. 
Data from the victim: personal information, profession, HBV immune status, time 
of reporting. Data from the accident: time, place of occurrence, place of injury, the 
cause and the object of injury and the scaling of severity of the incident. 
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RESULTS 
 
During one year the counselling centre received 980 phone-calls resulting in a 
total of 454 reported incidents. (Table 1) There were an almost equal number of 
incidents reported from the community (n=234) compared to hospital related 
incidents (n=220). Ninety five percent of the injuries (n=432) occurred during 
work, whereas 15% (n=69) incidents were not related to health care activity. 
In the hospital we registered 10.6 incidents per 100 FTE HCW. Outside the 
hospital the rate of incidents per 100 FTE was 1.7 in nursing homes, 0.81 within 
the police force and 1.06 within prisons, respectively. 
 
Table 1: Injuries categorized by occupation. 
 Hospital 
n = 234 
(%) 
 Community 
n = 220 
(%) 
 
Nursing staff 
 
46 
 
HCW not in hospital 
 
69 
Ancillary* 18 Prison/police 10 
OR staff 13 Civilians  10 
Physicians 13 Others work related** 11 
Others 10  
 
 
*  Supporting staff such as laboratory and radiology staff 
** Cleaning staff, waitresses, kitchen staff, security staff etc 
 
Tables 2 and 3 show in which setting the incidents occurred. Most of the injuries 
outside the hospital occurred among HCW in home health care and nursing homes 
(48%), whereas 10% took place in prison and police work. In the community 
injuries took place when first aid was given by civilians (4%) or in situations such 
as burglary and molestation, fights, accidental needle sticks in park and human 
bites (15%). Table 4 shows the distribution of the type of blood exposures. In 
hospitals 49% of incidents occurred with non-blood filled needles and 24% with 
blood filled needles in the community these numbers were 63% and 4% 
respectively. Table 5 shows the severity of the injuries as they were assessed by 
the counselling centre and HBV vaccination coverage in both settings. Thirty-six 
incidents were judged not to pose risk either because the skin was intact or the 
needle was not contaminated. Hospital HCW reported more severe incidents (23% 
high risk incidents) than HCW from outside hospitals (6% high risk incidents). 
Conversely, in the hospital more HCW (95%) who were exposed and reported 
needle stick incidents were vaccinated, compared to HCW outside hospitals 
(37%). 
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Table 2: Hospital acquired incidents categorized by place of occurrence. 
 
n = 234 
(%) 
 
Medical/Surgical Units 33 
Theatre  16 
X-Ray / Radiology / Laboratory 15 
Outpatient / short stay 8 
Emergency 6 
Maternity 6 
Dialysis 5 
Sterile Services 4 
Kitchen / Cleaning / Others 4 
ICU 3 
 
Table 3: Community acquired incidents categorized by place of occurrence. 
  
n = 220 
(%) 
 
Nursing homes  38 
Other places not health care related 15 
Home health care 10 
General practitioners office 7 
Mental hospital 6 
Police work (street or office) 6 
Dental care office 4 
Prison 4 
Refuge accommodation centres  4 
First aid by civilians 4 
Other healthcare (ambulance, midwifes etc.) 2 
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Table 4: Type of exposure. 
 
Hospital 
n = 234 
(%) 
Community 
n = 220 
(%) 
Non-blood filled needles*  49 63 
Blood filled hollow-bore needles 24 4 
Cuttings by sharps 15 8 
Human bites and scratches 0 12 
Spillage of blood or body fluids 6 8 
Sexual incident 0 2 
Non used hollow-bore needles 6 3 
 
* Subcutaneous and intra-muscular used needles and suture needles 
 
Table 5: Risk assessment and level of immunization  
 
Hospital 
n = 234 
(%) 
Community 
n = 220 
(%) 
 
High risk 23 6 
Low risk 68 87 
No risk 9 7 
Total HBV vaccinated 95 37 
Source known 80 74 
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Figure 1 shows the time lag between occurrence and reporting of the incident. 
Incidents within the hospital were reported earlier than those from the community. 
Within 2 hours 86% of the hospital incidents and 62% of the community incidents 
were reported. For 2, 4, 8 and 48 hours these figures were 86% - 62%, 89% - 69%, 
92% - 77% and 98% - 96% respectively. 
 
Figure 1: Time interval between occurrence and reporting of the incident, hospital incidents 
compared to community-acquired cases. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Setting up a 24 hours a day accessible expert counselling service, we were able to 
prospectively register all blood exposure incidents from the community as well as 
from the hospitals in our region. During one year (2003) we registered 453 
incidents, 234 occurred from a hospital setting and 220 incidents from the 
community. While our hospital data are comparable to other studies [1,10,11], we 
were surprised to find nearly 50% of incidents originating from the community. 
Data of such blood exposure incidents from the community are scarce. [8,12] 
The severity of the incidents sustained in the community was lower than in 
hospitals, mainly because fewer incidents were due to blood filled hollow-bore 
needles. There is a short time frame for proper and effective prevention after an 
incident. HBV immunoglobuline has to be administered within 48 hours after an 
incident [13], for prevention of HIV post exposure prophylaxis has to be 
administered within 4-8 hours after the incident. [13] Within this period risk 
analysis and laboratory tests have to be done, and treatment has to be supplied to 
the patient. 
 
Needle stick injuries from the community, even though many of these were 
healthcare related, were reported later than those from the hospital.  A significant 
number of incidents were reported too late to effectively prevent potential HIV 
transmission and some were even reported too late to prevent potential HBV 
transmission. Moreover, if after reporting the incident, essential steps for the 
proper handling of the incident are not immediately taken, valuable time can be 
lost. We think our center may handle incidents faster than most other healthcare 
providers, because of our standardized operational procedures and experienced 
staffing. 
HCW working outside hospitals should be made aware of the need and importance 
to immediately report incidents. 
The vaccination rate among injured HCW from outside the hospital were much 
lower (37%) compared to hospital based HCW (97%). Even though the incidents 
from the community were less severe than those from the hospital more medical 
interventions were needed. Due to the low vaccination rate in the community more 
preventable measures such as HBIG, HBV vaccination, and sources testing had to 
be applied. 
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Although some of the civilians were involved in medical practices such as 
resuscitation, a total of 29% of the community related incidents were not related to 
healthcare. 
To consider interventions the strategy in the community has to differ from the 
strategy in hospital settings. Whereas in hospitals we can focus on safety devices 
and safety protocols and training, in the community accidents are difficult to 
prevent, therefore a higher level of immunization should be achieved. Active 
propagation of HBV immunization would be an intervention for certain major 
groups (HCW, police, and prison) to minimize future risks after blood exposure. 
We believe that increasing the awareness on the risk of needle stick incidents for 
HCW in the community should lead to an increase in vaccination rates among 
these workers, even though in our data the risk of an incident in the community 
was ten times lower than in a hospital. 
 
In numerous countries programs to raise awareness on safety and prevention of 
occupational exposure were launched. [4] As a result employers in the 
Netherlands are forced by law to register all incidents and to reduce the risk of 
blood exposure. 
We conclude that there is a need for a 24 hours a day accessible expert counselling 
centre for hospital as well as for non-hospital blood exposure incidents. Within 
hospitals a reduction of high-risk incidents should be achieved, whereas outside 
hospitals more awareness about early reporting and vaccination should be created. 
Early reporting and speedy handling of needle incidents are critical to deliver 
adequate care for blood exposure incidents. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
A regional counselling centre was established to handle all accidental blood 
exposures using a standardized protocol. Levels of risks were assessed using an 
algorithm. 
Accidents that posed a risk for the transmission of hepatitis B (HBV), 
hepatitis C (HCV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) were classified as 
“high risk”, whereas accidents that only posed a risk for HBV alone were 
classified as “low risk”. Medical interventions were implemented according to the 
risk level. During a one-year period all accidents were registered and analysed for 
adherence to the standard protocol. 
In 2003 the centre handled a total of 454 incidents. Of these, 36 (7.9%) 
incidents were assessed as no risk, 329 (72.5%) were assessed as low risk, and 67 
(14.8%) were assessed as high risk. Due to incomplete registration 22 (4.8%) 
incidents could not be analysed further. 
In total, 36% of the incidents with risk for HBV transmission and 40% of 
the incidents with risk for HCV and HIV transmission were not handled according 
the proposed protocol. 
Breaches consisted of over-reaction (25/396) as well as an insufficient 
response (123/396). Potentially inadequate treatment occurred for HIV-post 
exposition prophylaxis in 12 of 63 incidents. Incomplete follow-up for HCV 
occurred in 11 of 63 incidents, and lack of HBV immunoglobuline administration 
in 5 of 396 incidents, including 3 high-risk incidents. In 21 of 396 low-risk 
exposures, the breaches in protocol resulted from late reporting. 
It remains difficult to achieve an acceptable level of standardized care when 
using standard operational procedures. Documentation and evaluating of flaws are 
essential to improve the system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The management of accidental blood exposures is a challenge for counsellors as 
accidental blood exposures pose a small but significant risk for transmission of 
blood borne pathogens, and there may be much anxiety among the victims of 
blood exposure incidents. [1-3] Counselling and prevention of transmission of 
blood borne pathogens is based on the analysis of risk factors and sero-
/vaccination status of the source and the recipient. [1,4-11] The data required to 
inform the recipient appropriately have to be obtained and analysed within a short 
period of time. Thus, counselling as well as the administration of post exposure 
prophylaxis (PEP) have to be achieved within specific deadlines. [1,4-10] 
 
In collaboration with all health care providers and the public health services 
in North-East Brabant, The Netherlands, a regional public counselling centre for 
blood exposure incidents was established. This centre is staffed by a group of 
specially trained infection control practitioners and infectious disease specialists. 
The aim of the counselling centre is to provide a standardized service for all 
people, within and outside health care settings, suffering a blood exposure 
incident. 
An algorithm to categorize the risk levels of blood exposure incidents was 
developed to standardize the procedure for blood exposure handling. Adherence to 
this standard procedure was monitored over a period of one year and the results of 
that surveillance are presented here. 
 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
Counselling centre: 
The regional counselling centre for blood exposure incidents operates for 24 h/day 
and is easily accessible by telephone. Specially trained infection control 
practitioners with a background in nursing or microbiology staff the centre, with 
the permanent support of an infectious disease specialist. All incoming calls are 
registered, the risk involved in the incident is analysed, the recipient is counselled 
and a plan of action is provided. If necessary, arrangements are made for blood 
collection, laboratory testing, and administration of immunoglobulin and/or PEP. 
Follow-up procedures are also initiated. The centre receives calls from both 
hospital and non-hospital health care workers (HCW) and people working in other 
occupations. 
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Risk assessment: 
Accidental blood exposures were categorized into three levels of risk (Table 1). 
High-risk accidents were defined as percutaneous accidents involving a significant 
amount of blood, such as with the use of hollow-bore needles, cuts involving used 
instruments, significant human bites, violent sexual incidents, and exposure of 
non-intact skin or mucous membranes to body fluids containing a significant 
visible amount of blood. High-risk accidents pose a risk for transmission of 
hepatitis B virus (HBV), hepatitis C virus (HCV) and human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV). [1,4,8,9] 
Low-risk accidents were defined as mucocutaneous accidents without 
bleeding. Examples are percutaneous accidents with hypodermic or intramuscular 
syringe needles, exposure to broken skin or mucous membranes, or body fluid 
exposure with a negligible amount of blood. In low-risk accidents, there is a 
negligible risk of transmission of HCV and HIV, and only preventive 
interventions for HBV are initiated. [1,4,8,9] 
No-risk accidents have no risk for transmission of blood borne viruses, and 
were defined as those accidents where no blood or body fluids were involved, or 
where a small amount of blood came into contact with intact skin. 
 
 
Table 1 Algorithm for risk identification of accidental blood exposures 
 
 Risk of Significance of exposure Quantity of blood exposure through 
High HBV 
HCV 
HIV 
Significant visible amount of blood Hollow bore needles, used sharps or knives with 
blood,  
human bites with visible blood, 
splashes with blood on mucous membranes or 
broken skin, 
violent sexual incidents with visible lesions.  
Low HBV only Body fluids, no significant amount of 
blood 
Suture needles, subcutaneous and intramuscular 
needles when not used in artery or vein, 
cuttings with used sharps with no visible blood, 
sexual incidents, human bites and scratches when 
no blood is involved, 
splashes with minimal blood on mucous 
membranes or broken skin. 
No risk No risk of blood 
borne viruses 
No body fluids or blood involved None of the above i.e. blood on intact skin, 
cuttings by unused sharps etc. 
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Medical interventions: 
Medical interventions were instituted according to the level of risk. HBV 
immunoglobulin was administered within 48 hours followed by HBV vaccination 
in non-vaccinated recipients when the source was hepatitis B surface antigen 
(HBsAg) positive or had an unknown HBV status. [1,9] If possible, sources were 
tested for HBsAg rather than automatic administration of HBV immunoglobulin to 
the recipient. Recipients were also advised to have HBV vaccination when they 
were at risk for recurrent blood exposure. 
In cases with HCV-positive sources or sources with unknown HCV status, 
recipients were tested for anti-HCV antibodies and alanine aminotransferase 
(ALT) activity at 6 weeks, 3 months and 6 months after the exposure. Interferon 
treatment was started in early seroconverters to prevent chronic hepatitis C. [8,9] 
Where the source was HIV positive or of unknown HIV status, recipients received 
PEP within 8 hours of the incident. [9] 
 
Retrospective study. 
The standard algorithm is shown in Figures 1 and 2. To analyse compliance with 
the algorithm, all the registration forms were screened retrospectively and all 
interventions were compared with the protocol. All breaches in the handling of the 
protocol were recorded. 
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Figure 1: Algorithm for high-risk incidents, aiming at risk reduction for transmission of HBV, 
HCV and HIV. 
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Figure 2: Algorithm for low risk incidents, aiming at risk reduction for transmission of HBV only. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Between 1 January and 31 December 2003, the centre handled 454 blood exposure 
incidents. Of these, 36 (7.9%) incidents were classified as ‘no-risk’ exposures. Of 
the 418 remaining incidents, 351 (77.3%) were low risk and 67 (14.8%) were high 
risk. 
Figure 3 shows the interval between occurrence and reporting of high- and 
low-risk incidents. Within the first 4 and 8 hours, high-risk incidents were 
reported significantly earlier than low-risk incidents (p = 0.018). This effect 
disappeared after 24 and 48 hours, respectively. Within 4 hours, 94% of high-risk 
incidents and 77% of low-risk incidents had been reported. For 8, 24 and 48 hours, 
these figures were 95% and 84%, 97% and 90%, and 98% and 94%, respectively. 
In total, 21 low-risk incidents were reported after 48 hours and three high-risk 
incidents were reported after 8 hours. 
Preventative measures against hepatitis B had to be instituted in 418 
incidents, as well as HCV and HIV prevention in 67 high-risk incidents. A total of 
patient's anti-HBs ≥10 IE/L 
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22 incidents (18 low risk and 4 high risk) could not be analysed due to incomplete 
records. 
Tables 2 and 3 show the preventive interventions taken and the major 
breaches for HBV (9/396), HCV (12/63) and HIV (12/63). Table 4 shows the 
minor breaches of the protocol. Overall, a total of 141/396 (36%) incidents with 
risk for HBV transmission and 25/63 (40%) incidents with risk for HCV and HIV 
transmission were not handled according to the proposed protocol. Multiple 
breaches occurred in 32 cases (8%). 
Breaches included initiating to many interventions (n = 25), such as testing 
the source when not indicated, and initiating to few interventions (n = 123). 
Moreover, in 38 of 138 cases, HBV vaccination was not advised after 
administering immunoglobulin despite there being a given indication according to 
the protocol. 
Initiation of serological tests was neglected in 72 cases: anti-HCV (n = 12), 
anti-HBV/HBsAg (n = 56) and anti-HIV (n = 4). Overall, three high-risk 
exposures and 21 low-risk exposures were reported at 8 and 48 hours, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 3: Interval between occurrence and reporting of incidents 
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Table 4: Minor breaches in protocol in all incidents (n=396*) 
(* 22/418 not analysed) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
        Total 
        n =112 
___________________________________________________________________ 
No anti-HBs tested in patient when indicated      3 
HbsAg in source not tested when indicated    56 
HbsAg tested in source when not indicated      2 
No advice HBV vaccination given when indicated   38 
Anti-HIV tested in source when not indicated      1 
Anti-HCV tested in source when not indicated      2 
Reference serum taken from patient when not indicated   20 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The effectiveness of the call centre in handling accidental blood exposures using 
standardized protocols and procedures was assessed. For appropriate prevention 
and care, recipients must report to the centre in good time and the centre must 
react promptly. [12,13] To achieve this, the centre must be known and easily 
accessible to all those concerned. For this reason, the work of the centre has been 
extensively communicated to all health care givers in the area. All staff have been 
trained to handle and register blood exposure incidents. During the first year of 
service, incidents were re-assessed weekly to analyse the quality and shortcomings 
of standardized handling of accidental blood exposures. The main shortcomings in 
the handling of blood exposure incidents were: non-adherence to the protocol by 
initiating to many or to few interventions, late reporting, logistical problems 
causing delay, and incomplete registration. 
 
In this study, laboratory investigations (anti-HCV, anti-HBV/HBsAg or anti-HIV) 
were not initiated despite this being indicated in the protocol in 15.3% of cases. 
Failing to initiate extra laboratory tests may be due to a low-risk perception by the 
experts in the centre or due to reasons beyond their control. Breaches in procedure 
beyond the control of the centre included the source not wanting to be tested, 
having been tested recently for other reasons, or not being able to obtain blood 
from the source outside the hospital. In addition, counsellors may make mistakes, 
especially as the protocol allows multiple options. Rarely, recipients were 
reluctant to ask the source to be tested. For this reason, a number of cases were not  
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advised about HBV immunoglobulin and there was no follow-up with regard to 
HCV. 
 
In 38 cases, HBV vaccination was not advised due to flaws in the initial protocol 
that allowed multiple options at some stages in the algorithm. The protocol was 
adjusted in this respect later in the year. In general, compliance with the protocol 
was especially challenging in settings outside the hospital. 
 
Anxiety of the recipient and/or the counsellor may have been the main reason for 
initiating to many interventions. [1,3] The actual risk was probably overestimated 
by counsellors who were lacking in experience or who were insecure in making 
decisions. Re-assessment and continuous feedback may help to reduce this. At 
times, the counselling centre had to base decisions on conflicting information. 
Under such circumstances, taking additional measures is unavoidable. 
Furthermore, in some cases, unnecessary laboratory testing was initiated by other 
health care providers without consulting the centre. 
 
Defining and evaluating late reporting is complicated as evidence on this topic is 
less than clear. [9] Lack of clear definitions is obviously detrimental to the 
implementation of a good protocol. Preventive measures are certainly less 
effective after certain deadlines. However, the causes of late reporting are 
frequently outside the influence of a counselling centre. Recipient-related reasons 
for late reporting may be poor access to care, a low-risk perception or lack of 
awareness of the need to report. In general, hospital incidents were reported earlier 
than community incidents, and recipients with a high-risk exposure reported 
earlier than recipients with a low-risk exposure. To improve early reporting, 
awareness has to be increased, especially in the public health sector and outside 
hospitals. In addition to early reporting, prompt availability of laboratory tests is 
necessary to shorten the overall response time. The introduction of point-of-source 
tests (e.g. HIV tests) may improve the quality of the system in this respect. 
 
Continuous monitoring of the performance of the counselling centre has proved to 
be valuable, if not essential, to the quality of performance and has led to changes 
and adaptations in the standardized protocol. However, using standardized 
operational procedures and flowcharts to handle accidental blood exposure 
remains difficult, especially as the anxiety of recipients is often high and the time 
in which to handle the problem is limited. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Objective 
Throughout 2003–2005, all blood-exposure incidents registered by an expert 
counseling center in The Netherlands accessible by telephone 24 hours a day, 
7 days a week, were analyzed to assess quality improvement in the center’s 
management of such incidents. The expert center was established to handle blood-
exposure incidents that occur both inside and outside of a hospital. Infection 
control practitioners carried out risk assessment, made the practical arrangements 
associated with managing incidents, and carried out treatment and follow-up, all in 
accordance with standardized procedures. 
 
Design 
We analyzed the time it took for exposed individuals to report the incident, the 
time required to perform a human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) test for the 
source individual when needed, occurrence of injuries, hepatitis B (HBV) 
vaccination status of exposed individuals, and adherence to protocol at the expert 
center. 
 
Results 
A mean of 465 incidents was registered during each year of the 3-year study 
period. Although 698 (50%) of 1,394 reported exposures took place in a hospital, 
704 (50%) took place outside of a hospital, and 460 (33%) occurred at a time other 
than regular office hours. HIV tests for source individuals were performed 
increasingly quickly over the course of the 3-year study period because of earlier 
reporting and improvements in practical matters associated with performing and 
processing the tests. The percentage of healthcare workers employed outside a 
hospital who were vaccinated against HBV increased from 34% (52 of 152) to 
70% (119 of 170) during the 3-year study period. Consequently, the administration 
of immunoglobulin and unnecessary laboratory testing were reduced. In assessing 
the quality of the expert center, flaws in the handling of incidents were identified 
in 148 (37%) of 396 incidents analyzed in 2003, compared with 38 (8%) of 461 
incidents analyzed in 2005. 
 
Conclusions. 
The practical matters associated with management of blood-exposure incidents, 
such as timely reporting and administration of prophylaxis, should be optimized 
for incidents that occur at times other than regular office hours and outside of 
hospitals. The establishment of a 24-hour centralized counseling facility that was 
open 7 days a week to manage blood exposures resulted in significant 
improvements in incident management and better care. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite the fact that the prevalence of infection due to hepatitis B virus (HBV), 
hepatitis C virus (HCV), or human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection is 
relatively low in The Netherlands, [1-3] blood-exposure incidents still have a great 
impact on the individuals exposed to blood and body fluids, causing anxiety and 
stress. [4,5] Although many healthcare institutions have guidelines for the 
management of blood-exposure incidents, only a few have established facilities 
where exposed individuals have instant access to medical care, 24 hours a day, 
7 days a week. [6-8] Instead, exposed individuals are often referred to hospital 
emergency departments or public health physicians. Especially after regular office 
hours, this approach to incident management may cause unnecessary delay in 
addition to creating the possibility of inconsistencies in risk assessment. [6] 
Timely reporting of an incident to an experienced healthcare provider will allow 
the exposed individual to receive proper preventive treatment and counseling. 
Assessing the risk of transmission of bloodborne pathogens is a complex matter 
that depends on variables such as the type of injury, the amount of blood 
transmitted, the infectiousness of the source individual, and the exposed 
individual’s level of protective antibodies. [9-11] The success of postexposure 
prophylaxis (PEP) and other treatment depends on the duration of the interval 
between the incident and the administration of preventive measures. Therefore, 
fast and consistent assessment of a blood-exposure incident is essential, both to 
prevent infection with bloodborne viruses and to deliver proper care while 
preventing unnecessary stress and anxiety. [9-11] 
 
In 2002, we established a 24-hour telephone center in collaboration with all 
healthcare providers in our region and the public health service. This center was 
intended to improve the management of blood-exposure incidents and the 
counseling of exposed individuals in our region. The center handles all reports of 
blood-exposure incidents by telephone. This expert counseling center was partially 
funded by the participating hospitals and regional community health services. For 
work-related accidents, the cost of managing the incident was charged to the 
employer of the injured individual. 
 
During the 3-year study period, we prospectively analyzed factors that could 
influence how well blood-exposure incidents were managed. The major factors we 
addressed were as follows: adherence to the incident management protocol; 
effective performance of the practical matters associated with managing the 
incident; the interval between exposure and assessment of the incident; 
management of exposures that occurred at a time other than regular office hours 
(including immediate HIV testing); testing the source individual involved in the  
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exposures, for both in-hospital and out-of-hospital exposures; the HBV 
vaccination status of the exposed individual; and the overall quality of incident 
handling by the expert center. 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Population and Region 
The expert counseling center provides service to 2 hospital organizations spread 
over 5 locations. These facilities have a total of 1,786 hospital beds, and they 
employ a total of 2,207 fulltime equivalent (FTE) healthcare workers (HCWs). 
Furthermore, the center serves a semirural region (an area of 1,250 km2) with 1 
major city that has more than 100,000 inhabitants and an overall population of 
approximately 500,000 inhabitants. The total number of community members 
employed in home healthcare settings and nursing homes is estimated at 6,500 
FTE workers. In addition, there are approximately 260 general practitioners, 230 
dentists, and 2,350 FTE police workers and prison officers. 
 
Logistical Details of Incident Management 
All management of in-hospital and out-of-hospital blood-exposure incidents is 
referred to the regional expert counseling center. The call center operates 24 hours 
a day to allow immediate access to reporting and counseling. The center is staffed 
by infection control practitioners, with backup from infectious diseases specialists. 
It registers all incoming calls, provides risk assessment for incidents, informs and 
counsels exposed individuals, and provides a plan of action for starting 
prophylactic treatment. The center initiates laboratory tests, obtains informed 
consent for testing from source individuals, and, if necessary, provides 
medication. Medication can be given in hospital emergency departments, and 
laboratory tests can be performed in 1 of the 2 regional hospitals 24 hours a day, 
7 days a week. Reports and written instructions for follow-up are sent to a general 
practitioner or the appropriate occupational healthcare officer. Extensive 
advertising was placed in both regional institutions and local papers when the 
center started offering its services, and all healthcare institutions received written 
instructions that included a short protocol for reporting a blood-exposure incident. 
 
Protocol 
Blood-exposure incidents were classified into 1 of 3 major risk categories, 
depending primarily on the severity of the exposure. High-risk incidents were 
defined as those in which there was a risk of possible exposure to HBV, HCV, and 
HIV, and there was significant percutaneous exposure to blood, such as injuries 
involving hollow-bore, blood-filled needles. Low-risk incidents were defined as  
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those in which there was a risk of exposure to HBV only, and there was 
percutaneous exposure to only a negligible amount of blood. No-risk incidents, in 
which there was no risk for transmission of bloodborne pathogens, were defined as 
incidents in which no blood or body fluids were involved and/or the skin remained 
intact. [12] Each reported incident was registered in a standardized fashion. The 
majority of incidents were analyzed, and incident management was assessed 
weekly for adherence to the standard protocol. Flaws in the protocol and violations 
of protocol were discussed with the members of the center. 
 
Incident Analysis 
In this study, we analyzed the following features for all blood-exposure incidents 
that involved a risk of transmitting bloodborne virus registered between January 
2003 and December 2005: 1) the reporting delay, defined as the interval between 
the incident and the risk assessment; 2) the turnaround time for HIV testing of the 
source individual, defined as the time between the incident and the availability of 
the HIV test result (for all incidents between January 2004 and March 2005 that 
involved the risk of HIV transmission, the time from the exposure to completion 
of the enzyme immunoassay was also recorded); 3) the level of risk for in-hospital 
and out-of-hospital incidents; 4) the percentage of incidents that occurred after 
regular office hours; 5) the number of protocol violations made at the expert 
center, which were categorized into those related to incidents that required 
minimal interventions by the center (low-risk incidents) and those related to 
incidents that required significant interventions by the center (high-risk incidents), 
as outlined in the algorithms in which the handling is described [12]; and 6) the 
HBV vaccination status of the exposed individual. 
 
Data Analysis and Statistics 
Odds ratios (ORs) and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) were calculated to show the 
differences in risk between in-hospital and out-of-hospital incidents. Univariate 
logistic models were used to calculate p values, 95% CIs, and ORs for risk 
assessment, violations of protocol, and reporting delay, using the 3 years of 
collected data. A stepwise linear regression model was used to calculate the 
relationship between the time when the exposure occurred and the time when the 
HIV test for the source individual was performed. Possible confounders, such as 
whether the exposure occurred in or outside of a hospital, reporting delay, and 
whether the exposure took place during or after regular office hours, were taken 
stepwise into the model. All data were analyzed using SPSS for Windows (SPSS). 
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RESULTS 
 
During the 3-year study period, 1,394 incidents were registered. In 2003, there 
were 454 incidents; in 2004, there were 475; and in 2005, there were 465. A total 
of 689 incidents occurred in a hospital, and 704 occurred outside of a hospital. 
 
Rapidity of Incident Reporting 
In 2003, the percentage of in-hospital staff injuries that were reported within 2 
hours was 70% (164 of 234); by 2005, this had increased to 81% (183 of 225). At 
the beginning of the study period, the percentage of out-of-hospital injuries that 
were reported within 2 hours was 50% (109 of 220); by 2005, this had increased to 
58% (139 of 240). During the study period, the percentage of injuries reported 
within 24 hours increased from 78% (183 of 234) to 94% (212 of 225) for in-
hospital injuries and from 69% (151 of 220) to 86% (207 of 240) for out-of-
hospital injuries (Table 1). 
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HIV Testing for Source Individuals 
Figure 1 shows the change during a 14-month period in the time interval between 
a high-risk incident and the availability of the HIV test result for the source 
individual. Between January 2004 and March 2005, there were 59 blood-exposure 
incidents registered in which the source individual was tested for HIV. There was 
a significant decline in the interval between the incident and the availability of the 
test result during this period (regression coefficient, -0.25 [95% CI, -0.44 to -
0.07]; p= .01). Possible confounding factors, such as whether the incident took 
place in or outside of a hospital, the reporting delay, and whether the incident took 
place after regular office hours, had no significant influence on this outcome. 
 
Figure 1: Time interval between occurrence of the high risk incident and the result of the HIV test 
performed in source. 
cases
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Risk Level of Exposure 
During the 3-year study period, there were 243 high-risk incidents. Of 690 in-
hospital injuries, 189 (27%) were high risk; of 704 out-of-hospital injuries, 56 
(8%) were high risk (OR, 4.25 [95% CI, 1.82–9.91]). There were 1,073 low-risk 
incidents during the study period. A total of 471 in-hospital injuries (68%) and 
602 out-of-hospital injuries (86%) were low risk (OR, 0.35 [95% CI, 0.25– 0.77]).  
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There were 30 no-risk in-hospital injuries (4%) and 48 no-risk out-of-hospital 
injuries (7%) (OR, 0.55 [95% CI, 0.16 –1.95]). 
 
Risk Assessment 
 
Of 1,394 blood-exposure incidents, 460 (33%) occurred after regular office hours. 
In 2003, there were 418 incidents in which the exposed individual was at risk of 
contracting HBV, HCV, and/or HIV; the source individual was known for 352 
(84%) of these incidents. In 2004, the source individual was known for 383 (84%) 
of 457 incidents in which the exposed individual was at risk; in 2005, the source 
individual was known for 392 (89%) of 442 incidents (p=.72, for comparison of 
2003 and 2005 data). Of the 85 source individuals tested for HBV in 2003, there 
were 5 who tested positive; 85 individuals were tested in 2004, and 3 tested 
positive; 63 individuals were tested in 2005, and 3 tested positive. Of the 61 
source individuals tested for HCV in 2003, there were 6 who tested positive; 79 
individuals were tested in 2004, and 3 tested positive; 71 individuals were tested 
in 2005, and 1 tested positive. Of the 67 source individuals tested for HIV in 2003, 
there was 1 who tested positive; 79 individuals were tested in 2004, and 3 tested 
positive; 71 individuals were tested in 2005, and 1 tested positive. PEP was 
administered once in 2003, once in 2004, and 5 times in 2005. Hepatitis B 
immunoglobulin was administered 85 times in 2003, 81 times in 2004, and 59 
times in 2005 (Table 2). 
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Execution of Protocol 
The number of protocol violations made by members of the expert center 
decreased significantly during the 3-year study period (p<.001). In 2003, of 396 
incidents analyzed, 148 (37%) involved a violation; in 2004, of 452 incidents 
analyzed, 78 (17%) involved a violation; and in 2005, of 461 incidents analyzed, 
38 (8%) involved a violation. More detailed information about the number of 
incidents in which the expert center provided an inappropriate number of 
interventions is given in Table 3. 
 
Hepatitis B Vaccination 
Although the rate of hepatitis B vaccination among all injured hospital employees 
remained fairly constant during the study period (in 2003, the rate was 87% (204 
of 234 injured employees); in 2004, it was 94% (217 of 231); and in 2005, it was 
92% (206 of 224), the rate of hepatitis vaccination among HCWs injured outside a 
hospital increased significantly (p<.01). For HCWs involved in bloodexposure 
incidents outside a hospital, the vaccination rate in 2003 was 34% (52 of 152), in 
2004 it was 51% (88 of 173), and in 2005 it was 70% (119 of 170). For all other 
individuals involved in blood-exposure incidents outside a hospital (ie, individuals 
who were not HCWs), the rate of hepatitis B vaccination in 2003 was 16% (11 of 
68), in 2004 it was 17% (12 of 71), and in 2005 it was 24% (17 of 170). 
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DISCUSSION 
 
The number of incidents reported each year during the 3 years since the center 
opened has remained constant. The constant number of incidents is surprising; one 
might have expected an increased number as a result of increased awareness. 
During the year before this study, information about the new center was 
extensively communicated to HCWs and others likely to be involved in blood-
exposure incidents. Although the literature suggests that one must consider an 
average underreporting rate of 30%–50%, [9,13,14] we did not further assess 
possible underreporting as a reason for the constant number of incidents reported 
because we presumed that the service was easily accessible. The increase in the 
HBV vaccination rate during the study may have masked the effect of increased 
awareness created by the center. 
 
Efficient Practical Management of Blood-Exposure Incidents 
Immediate reporting of incidents makes the handling of practical matters 
associated with a blood-exposure incident easier for the counselor. If an incident is 
reported promptly, more time is available to obtain blood from the source 
individual, perform testing, and administer preventive measures before the 
deadline for their effectiveness has passed. Guidelines advise that prophylactic 
medications should be administered as soon as possible after the incident if they 
are to be the most effective. [15-17] Therefore, an expert counseling center should 
be well known and easily accessible to all professionals at occupational risk for 
bloodborne diseases. For incidents that occur outside a hospital, the management 
of these practical matters is even more complex than it is in a hospital, where all 
necessary resources are at hand. For this reason, those who employ at-risk 
individuals outside hospital settings should instruct their employees adequately. 
Our study shows that instructions are helpful in reducing reporting delay. 
Analysis showed that the turnaround time for HIV testing decreased 
significantly during the 14 months that the center collected data on this procedure. 
We did not find any significant effect from possible confounders such as location, 
reporting delay, or the time the exposure occurred. Decreasing the turnaround time 
for HIV testing gave counsellors more time to collect the test results necessary for 
assessing whether PEP should be administered. [9-11] A rapid HIV test could 
potentially decrease turnaround time further1 [8,19]; however, such a test would 
need to be available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, at multiple sites, and it would 
need to be able to be performed by laypeople. Currently, we do not see any 
advantages to using a test other than the conventional immunoassay. 
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Risk Level 
Throughout the study, the majority of high-risk incidents occurred in a hospital, 
whereas the majority of out-of-hospital incidents were low risk. Hospitals have to 
be well prepared to handle high-risk incidents, and they should preferably have all 
necessary laboratory tests and PEP available at all times. On the other hand, a high 
hepatitis B vaccination rate makes handling low-risk incidents easier, and 
increasing the HBV vaccination rate is the best method for preventing 
transmission of HBV in low-risk incidents. The improvement in the HBV 
vaccination rate during the study period—the result of a national campaign that 
coincided with the opening of the expert counseling center, and partly created by 
feedback from our center—did indeed facilitate the handling of low-risk incidents 
by reducing the need to administer immunoglobulin. 
 
Risk Assessment 
More than one-third of the incidents registered in this study were reported after 
regular office hours, which shows the need for continuous service to guarantee 
quality in care. We confirm that a 24-hour service is essential, as has been shown 
by Patel et al. [6] During the study period, the percentage of incidents in which the 
source individual could not be identified ranged from 11% to 16% (66 of 418 
incidents in 2003; 74 of 457 in 2004; and 50 of 442 in 2005). These incidents were 
mostly caused by discarded needles from sharp device containers and needles or 
other blood-contaminated sharp devices that had been left lying out (an injury that 
primarily affected cleaning staff). Targeted feedback of this information to the 
departments involved can actually help to reduce the incidence of this problem. 
Assessing risk from incidents in which the source individual cannot be identified 
is challenging. No definite risk estimation can be given in such cases, and 
serologic follow-up is required, leading to more anxiety for the exposed 
individual. Although PEP was administered more often in 2005 than in the 2 
previous years, this difference was not significant. However, one reason for the 
increased administration of PEP might be that unidentified source individuals 
could not be tested after high-risk exposures. On the other hand, significantly less 
immunoglobulin was administered in 2005 than in previous years, because the 
source individuals for low-risk exposures were tested more appropriately. 
 
HBV Vaccination Rates 
The increase of the HBV vaccination rate from 34% to 70% among HCWs 
employed outside a hospital obviously directly decreased the risk for HBV 
transmission. In 2003, hepatitis B immunoglobulin had to be administered to 86 
exposed individuals, whereas in 2005, this number decreased to 59. This made the 
handling of low-risk incidents far simpler. The Dutch government only advises 
HBV vaccination for limited risk groups. Institutions that employ HCWs should  
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actively promote and provide HBV vaccination, to prevent infection. Also, the 
Dutch labor inspectorate could play an active role in stimulating healthcare 
institutions to set up hepatitis B vaccination programs. [20] 
 
Quality Control 
During the 3 years of the study, the number of incidents that involved protocol 
violations committed by members of the expert center decreased significantly, 
thereby improving the way in which blood-exposure incidents were handled. 
Although inadequate handling of these incidents is potentially harmful to HCWs, 
overly careful management may lead to unnecessary laboratory testing and/or the 
administration of unnecessary medication. Counseling and support for the exposed 
individual can be done in a uniform way. However, it is not easy to achieve and 
maintain a high level of expertise. Each new expert center will require time and 
experience to gain knowledge about how to apply the protocol appropriately. In 
addition to medical knowledge, the members of each expert center will also 
require training and experience in the psychosocial skills needed to handle various 
situations as they arise. 
In conclusion, the counseling center improved several aspects of the 
management of blood-exposure incidents. The center was accessible by telephone 
24 hours a day, 7 days a week, which provided an easy and less time-consuming 
way to report blood-exposure incidents. We were able to reduce the reporting 
delay, improve the handling of practical matters associated with an incident 
(especially after regular office hours), improve the quality of incident 
management, and, by increasing HBV vaccination rates, reduce the administration 
of immunoglobulin. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Blood exposure incidents pose a risk for transmission of blood born pathogens for 
both healthcare workers and in public health. Despite several national and 
international guidelines, counsellors have often different opinions about the risks 
caused by these incidents. Little is known about the consequences of these 
variations in risk assessment on the effectiveness of the treatment and the costs for 
the healthcare system. 
The aim of this study was to reveal differences between diverse groups of 
counsellors in assessing the same blood exposure incidents. 
Subjects included 4 different kinds of counsellors: public health physicians from 
infectious disease departments, medical microbiologists, occupational health 
practitioners and HIV/AIDS specialists from hospital settings. 
Surveys with cases of blood exposure incidents were sent to the counsellors 
in The Netherlands asking questions about their risk assessment and consequent 
treatment. Questions were categorized for hepatitis B virus (HBV), hepatitis C 
virus (HCV) and HIV risks. 
Of the 449 surveys sent, 178 were returned of which 158 were eligible for 
the study. In general, occupational health practitioners and medical 
microbiologists showed a more rigorous approach especially with regard to 
prophylactic treatment when counselling HBV risk situations, whereas public 
health physicians and HIV/AIDS specialists were more thorough in the handling 
of HCV risk accidents. In HIV counselling, HIV/AIDS specialists were far more 
rigorous in their treatment than the other groups. For 7 of the total of 12 cases the 
risk assessment with regard to HBV, HCV and HIV differed significantly. 
The assessment of blood exposures significantly differs depending on the 
medical background of the counsellor handling the incident, leading to remarkable 
inconsistencies in the response to prevent the transmission of blood-borne 
pathogens and/or to increased costs for unnecessary diagnostic tests and 
preventive measures. While national guidelines for the counselling and treatment 
of blood exposure incidents are essential, the assessment of blood exposure 
incidents should be limited to as few as possible, well trained professionals, 
operating in regional or national call centres, to ensure comparable assessment and 
corresponding application of preventive measures for all victims. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Blood exposure incidents still pose a risk for transmission of hepatitis B (HBV), 
hepatitis C (HCV) and HIV. [1-5] Assessing the risk involved in an accident and 
counselling the patient is complicated. Within a limited period of time, 
information of the victim’s and the source’s serology status has to be collected and 
possibly complemented by additional laboratory tests, in order to take appropriate 
preventive measures. 
Blood exposure risks in hospital settings are mainly assessed by infectious disease 
and HIV/AIDS-specialists. However, blood exposure incidents are not limited to 
the hospital setting. Public health service physicians are involved in the risk 
assessment of blood exposure incidents in civilians or practitioners working in 
nursing homes and public institutions such as the police force. [6-8] 
Despite several national and international guidelines, counsellors may differ in 
assessing risks related to blood exposures as well as sexual incidents. [5,9] 
Furthermore, the quality of handling such incidents is rarely controlled. [10] 
Therefore, it was suggested that important differences in assessing similar cases of 
blood exposure incidents exist. [11,12] 
Inadequate risk assessment, especially when leading to ineffective or non-
preventive measures may furthermore have legal consequences for the 
counsellors. [11-15] 
In this study we evaluated the assessment of blood exposure incidents in 
counsellors from different healthcare settings and/or with a different medical 
background. 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Subjects 
Four major groups of counsellors of blood exposure incidents were identified in 
the Netherlands: 1) public health physicians trained in infectious disease, 2) 
occupational health practitioners, 3) HIV/AIDS specialists and 4) medical 
microbiologist practicing in hospitals. To members of these four groups a total of 
449 written questionnaires were sent which could be answered anonymous. 
Follow up reminders were sent after 2 months. The board of the different medical 
groups gave approval for this survey. 
 
Study design 
General questions were asked about counselling experience, the number of cases 
assessed per year and the protocol used. Subjects were asked whether they used a 
24/7 service and if they kept a registration of all incidents. More specific (case-
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oriented) questions were asked about assessing the risk of HBV, HCV and HIV 
after hypothetical needle stick incidents with different kinds of “used” needles. 
With regard to HBV the rationale to test HBsAg in the source, to administer 
Hepatitis B vaccination for the injured and the maximum time to administer 
Hepatitis B immunoglobulines (HBIg) were included in the questionnaire. 
For HCV and HIV questions were asked about their demand to test a source 
for anti-HCV/ anti-HIV when an incident had occurred with an insulin or an 
intramuscular needle, and which kind of follow up they would initiate. 
With regard to HIV counsellors were asked about their motivation to administer 
post exposure prophylaxis (PEP) after an incident with an unknown source, as 
well as their time limits to start PEP after an incident with a known HIV positive 
source or after an incident with an unknown source. Subjects could chose between 
a range from 2 hours until after 48 hours and a possibility not to administer PEP. 
The final questions tried to assess the counsellor’s way of handling the victim’s 
fear and anxiety and their communication with the victim’s general practitioner 
(GP). 
 
Answers were evaluated for each group of counsellors as well as for the different 
blood born viruses, using current Dutch guidelines as a reference. [9] Analyses 
were made to compare the answers of the different groups of counsellors using 
Chi-square tests. All statistical analyses were performed with SPSS version 12. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Response 
Between May and September 2005 a total of 178 of the 449 questionnaires (40%) 
were returned. Public health physicians 51/65 (78%), occupational health 
practitioners 48/131 (37%), HIV/AIDS specialists 17/73 (23%) and medical 
microbiologist 42/180 (23%). A total of 20 questionnaires were excluded from 
evaluation, due to wrong professions of the returnees’ (n=9), non-disclosure of the 
profession, or incomplete answers (n=11). Therefore, a total of 158 questionnaires 
were included in the analysis. 
Of these respondents, 32% worked in public health service, 18% in 
occupational health service while 20% and 27% worked in university and non 
university hospitals and 3% in other health care services, respectively. Most of the 
respondents (72%) had more than 5 years of counselling experience, only 24% had 
less than 5 years experience and 1% less than one year. In 3% the experience of 
the respondents was not known due to missing data. The cases assessed by the 
respondents varied from less than 10 cases per year (35%) and 10-20 cases per 
year (24%), to more than 20 cases per year (37%). 
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Four types of protocols used by the respondents were identified. Most 
frequently used was an institutional protocol (61%), followed by the national 
protocol (30%). Six percent used protocols of unknown origins (6%) and 1% 
followed CDC guidelines (Table 1). 
Table 1: Characteristics of respondents (n=158) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Job description   (%) 
 Public health physicians   51  (32) 
 Medical microbiologist  42  (27) 
 Occupational health practitioners  48  (30) 
 HIV/Aids specialists  17  (11) 
    
 
Institution   
 Public health services  50  (32) 
 Occupational health service 29  (18) 
 University hospital 32  (20) 
 Non university hospital 42  (27) 
 Other 3  (2) 
 Missing data 1  (1) 
 
Counselling experience   
 0-1 year 1  (1) 
 1-5 years 38  (24) 
 5-10 years 50  (31) 
 More then 10 years 65  (41) 
 Missing data 4  (3) 
 
Cases assessed per year   
 1-5  29  (18) 
 5-10 26  (17) 
 10 - 20 38  (24) 
 More than 20 58  (37) 
 Missing data 7  (4) 
 
Protocol used   
 National protocol (LCI) 48  (30) 
 CDC protocol 1  (1) 
 Own protocol 96  (61) 
 Other protocol 10  (6) 
 Missing data 3  (2) 
 
24/7 service   
 yes 110  (70) 
 no 42  (27) 
 Missing data 6  (4) 
24/7 service by others after office hours   
 yes 55  (32) 
 
Registration of all incidents   
 yes 120  (76) 
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For HBV, medical microbiologists were more persistent (88%) in trying to 
evaluate the serostatus of the source compared to HIV/AIDS specialists (71%) 
though this was not significant (p=0.08). Public health physicians administered in 
49% of the cases hepatitis B vaccine after an incident while this was up to 81% for 
occupational health practitioners (p=0.01). HIV/AIDS specialists were significant 
(p=0.44) more rigorous (71%) in administering HB immunoglobulines until 48 
hours after an incident than public health physicians (37%). (Table 2) 
In HCV counselling, HIV/AIDS specialists and public health physicians 
were more likely to test HCV in sources after an incident with an insulin needle, 
65% and 61% respectively (p<0.00), as well as with an incident with an 
intramuscular needle, 77% and 78% respectively (p<0.00). Medical 
microbiologists and occupational health practitioners ordered HCV testing of the 
source of incidents with insulin needles in 38 and 23% of the cases, respectively 
and 57 and 42% of the cases, respectively after incidents with intramuscular 
needles. (Table 3) 
HIV/Aids specialists ordered anti-HIV tests of the source, in 71% of the 
cases after an incident with an insulin needle while this was requested by only one 
third of the public health physicians, medical microbiologists and occupational 
health practitioners (31%, 29% and 31% respectively; (p=0.01). HIV/AIDS 
specialists administered PEP in 41% of the cases after an incident with an 
intramuscular needle and an unknown source, while this was 0%, 10% and 4% for 
public health physicians, medical microbiologists and occupational health 
practitioners, respectively (p<0.01). Forty-eight hours after an incident with a 
known HIV positive source PEP was still administered by 41% of the HIV/AIDS 
specialists, 24% of the public health physicians, 17% of the medical 
microbiologists and 13% of the occupational health practitioners (p=0.03). (Table 
4) 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Significant differences were shown between the various groups of counsellors 
when assessing risks and administering post exposure prophylaxis and HBV 
vaccination. The occupational health practitioners and microbiologist showed a 
more rigorous regime to apply preventive measures when counselling cases at risk 
of HBV. These counsellors more often ordered HBV vaccination and 
administration of HBIg even 48 hours after an incident with risk of HBV 
transmission. Recent guidelines and literature suggest that after administering 
HBIg as post-exposure prophylaxis additional HBV vaccination gives up to 5 
percent more protection against HBV transmission and may furthermore, be 
favourable, since former victims are at recurrent risk of future incidents. [5] 
In counselling cases at risk of HCV, in general public health physicians and 
HIV/AIDS specialists were more rigorous. Both groups were more likely to test 
anti HCV in a source, as well as initiate anti HCV and PCR follow up when the 
source was unknown, even after incidents with an insulin or intramuscular needle. 
[16,17] The LCI guideline does not adhere to such protocol. [9] 
HIV/AIDS specialists more often started PEP than the other groups of 
counsellors after blood exposure incidents. They furthermore were more likely to 
test anti HIV in a source after an incident with an insulin or an intramuscular 
needle, to administer PEP after an incident with an intramuscular needle and an 
unknown source, and to administer PEP more than 48 hours after the exposure to a 
known HIV positive source or an unknown source. The last can be explained by 
recent guidelines of HIV/AIDS specialists that show PEP to be effective, even 
when administered up to 72 hours after an incident. [5,18] 
More than a quarter (27%) of the counsellors did not supply 24/7 services, 
thereby making proper handling of blood exposure incidents impossible. Even 
when using an assisting backup service after office hours, it may be difficult to 
deliver adequate care when the handling of incidents is not fully standardized. 
The overall response rate was relatively low, which might be explained by the fact 
that only one of a group of counsellors working for the same institution returned 
the questionnaires. This might, in part, explain why the questionnaires were more 
frequently returned by more experienced respondents: 72% of the respondents had 
more than 5 years experience in handling blood exposure incidents and 61% 
assessed more than 10 cases per year (37% more than 20 cases). 
Although systematic surveillance data of the Netherlands are missing, 
available data show that the prevalence of blood born viruses is relatively low 
[20,21,22], but there are differences between rural and urban areas. When 
assessing incidents counsellors will take this into account. 
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Different counsellors work under different circumstances, for example, 
when an HIV/AIDS specialist will be consulted, the likelihood of a HIV positive 
source is higher than with other counsellors. This may influence decisions taken 
since these health care workers are more aware of the risk of HIV. Counsellors 
may also differ in risk assessment, depending on knowledge and experience. 
When counsellors take risks more seriously this again may increase the costs of 
healthcare. For instance administering HBIg straight away instead of testing a 
source is far more expensive. 
Incidents in the community may differ from incidents in hospital since the 
patients may have less knowledge and sources may be difficult to trace. Several 
authors have commented on the high degree of distress and anxiety that follow 
blood exposure incidents. [2,19] Also patients may be either over anxious or 
negligent on the risk perception, which can cause a different assessment. This may 
also have legal consequences after blood exposure incidents in occupational or 
even non-occupational settings. Therefore, not only assessing cases and 
administering medication should be given uniformly, but also information should 
be given consistently. Protocols that are developed should aim at standardized care 
to help counsellors with proper advise. 
In July 2005 the Dutch National Centre for Infectious Diseases initiated the 
development of a new protocol that probably will be implemented in the 
beginning of 2007. This protocol can provide a more standardized care for blood 
exposure incidents and will also give a possibility to compare larger areas in the 
Netherlands through a national surveillance. In this way also more data will be 
available to help make strategies for the prevention of blood exposure incidents. 
Access to such a system should be guaranteed nationally and equal assessment of 
the risk and care should be given in each part of the country 24 hours a day. 
Cabana et al described previously that there are several reasons why 
physicians do not follow practical clinical guidelines because of several barriers. 
They were described as lack of awareness, lack of familiarity, lack of agreement, 
lack of self efficacy, lack of outcome expectancy, the inertia of previous practice, 
and external barriers. [11] The development and implementation of the new Dutch 
protocol should be made with consent to all different counsellors to acquire 
adherence. Acceptance of a national protocol will be helpful to further standardise 
the procedures for all risk groups as well as in and outside the hospital, 
occupational and non-occupational settings. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Objective 
To determine how needle-stick injuries are dealt with in the Netherlands. 
 
Method 
Design. Study using questionnaires. 
In order to study whether victims of needle-stick injuries have access to proper 
treatment, we sent questionnaires to hospitals (n = 103) and Municipal Health 
Services (MHS) (n = 36) in the Netherlands. We enquired after the possibilities of 
risk-estimation and follow-up, the performance of necessary laboratory tests, 
direct administration of preventive medication and backup facilities. 
 
Results 
Questionnaires were returned by 113 (81%) institutions. 74% of the hospitals and 
71% of the MHS provided follow-up for needle-stick injuries from outside their 
own institution. Necessary laboratory tests were not always available or 
sometimes could not be performed on an immediate basis. In addition, essential 
medication was not always directly available. MHS recognized the advantage of 
cooperation during followup of needle-stick injuries more than hospitals. 
 
Conclusion 
Based on the results there is no guarantee that victims of needle-stick injuries in 
the Netherlands have access to appropriate care at any location in the Netherlands 
on a 24/7 basis. We recommend improvement of the infrastructure and 
cooperation between health care organizations to guarantee improved follow-up in 
every region. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Blood exposure accidents pose a risk for the transmission of hepatitis B virus 
(HBV), hepatitis C virus (HCV), and Human Immunodeficiency (HIV). [1,2,3] 
Both healthcare workers (HCW) inside and outside of hospitals as well as other 
staff such as police officers, prison staff and cleaning staff can be exposed. In 
addition civilians can be at risk as well. [4,5,6] Blood exposure accidents have to 
be assessed within a short time frame but can be complicated and time consuming. 
[7,8] Depending on the nature of the accident, victims can be very anxious. [9] For 
these reasons, adequate counselling and handling are essential. [1,2,3,10] Victims 
of blood exposure accidents need to have access to facilities where accidents can 
be assessed and dealt with correctly on a 24 hour basis. 
 
In 2006, a project was initiated in the Netherlands to improve the 
infrastructure and the standard of handling of blood exposure accidents. In the 
Netherlands, hospitals and Municipal Health Services (MHS) are most frequently 
involved in assessment and handling of blood exposure accidents, despite the fact 
that Dutch employers have a duty to insure proper occupational health care during 
work hours. Victims can either report to a hospital or contact a MHS. A number of 
issues are essential for assessment and handling of accidents.  
In order to assess the present standard of handling of blood exposure 
accidents in the Netherlands a questionnaire was sent to all Dutch hospitals and 
MHS. Here, we report the results of this survey. 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Setting and study population. 
The study was exploratory. A questionnaire was sent to all Dutch hospitals 
(n=103) and MHS (n=36) questioning facilities and ability to handle blood 
exposure accidents. The questionnaire was sent by name to infection control 
practitioners in the Dutch hospitals and infectious disease control specialist from 
MHS. Reminders were sent after one month. To get a good impression of the 
management of blood exposure accidents outside the hospitals, all MHS who had 
not responded the first time, were contacted by telephone one year later and 
reminded to fill out the questionnaire. Four MHS responded and these result were 
taken into account. 
 
Analyses 
In the analyses, questions were categorised in four main groups: the ability for 
handling of blood exposure accidents, the availability of necessary laboratory tests 
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and ability for immediate performance, availability of medication and the 
willingness for cooperation between the organisations for back up. We specifically 
asked for facilities regarding an adequate handling, like having the laboratory test 
available 24/7 and the ability to perform these immediately, having the necessary 
medication in stock, the willingness to handle accidents not from their own 
institution, the 24/7 availability to injured and possible arrangements with other 
institutions related to handling of blood exposure accidents. 
Answers were then analysed on national and regional (provincial) level. The 
“Yes” answers were analysed in percentages. The national results of all data were 
presented in tables. Accumulated regional data were depicted in figures. The SPSS 
statistical program was used to analyse the data and Chi-square tests were 
calculated when appropriate. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
From the 139 questionnaires sent, a total of 113 were returned (81%). The 
response from MHS and hospitals was comparable, 29/36 (81%) and 84/103 
(82%), respectively. 
 
Handling of accidents 
Of the responding institutions, 96% of the hospitals and 69% of MHS handle 
blood exposure accidents. (Table 1). Eighty-eight percent of the hospitals reported 
that their Emergency Department (ED) is always accessible for handling of blood 
exposure accidents. MHS report that this is possible in 82% in their region. One of 
the hospitals reported not to assess, nor handle blood exposure accidents. Three 
hospitals and two MHS do not have abilities to handle accidents on 24/7 basis. 
Seventy-four percent of the hospitals and 71% of MHS handle blood exposure 
accidents from outside their own institution. In one region, 7 of 13 hospitals do not 
handle blood exposure accidents from other organisations in contrast to the MHS 
in this region. 24/7 service is available in 79% of the hospitals and 93% of the 
MHS. On the question whether people other than own staff get assessment and 
handling, 72% of the hospitals and 61% of the MHS responded positive, in some 
cases only after consultation. 
 
Performance of laboratory tests 
In 93% of the hospitals an immediate HBsAg test is possible, in 76% an 
immediate anti-HBs test and in 29% a immediate anti-HIV test. In general, the 
MHS depend on neighbouring hospitals. For these services they have access to 
these tests in 100%, 87% en 41%, respectively. Both hospitals and MHS report 
that although immediate testing is ordered, due to logistical indications, laboratory  
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tests are not always performed rapidly, or, only during office hours. In 78% 
hospital tests are always performed immediately, while this was 81% in MHS 
(Table 2). 
 
Availability of medication 
Almost all hospitals (97%) have hepatitis B immunoglobulins (HBIG) available. 
Hepatitis B vaccine is available in 92% of hospitals en post exposition prophylaxis 
(PEP) to prevent HIV transmission in 86%. In MHS, this is 73%, 83% en 43%, 
respectively. (Table 2) 
 
Regional cooperation 
Back up facilities for blood exposure accidents, by cooperation with other 
institutions in their region, are available in 46% of the hospitals and 97% of the 
MHS. Finally, 42% of the hospitals, and 71% of the MHS, report to see an 
advantage in having a 24/7 access to a regional counselling centre. (Table 3) 
 
Regional analysis 
Two regions have a maximum score considering the infrastructure for handling of 
blood exposure accidents. In regard to immediate laboratory tests, 3 MHS score 
100% while hospitals have a maximum score of 82%. (Figure 1) In 6 regions, 
there is no 100% score on availability of medication, both for hospitals and MHS. 
(Figure 2) The need to cooperate was found to be significantly  greater for MHS 
than for hospitals. (χ2 test, p<0.05) 
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Figure 1: Rapid performing of laboratory test per province 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Medication available per province 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Handling of accidents  
Nationwide, more than a quarter of MHS and more than ten percent off the 
hospitals do not handle blood exposure accidents. One fifth of the hospitals and 
one quarter of MHS are reluctant to handle accidents from injured not belonging 
to their own staff. In almost a quarter of the hospitals and in ten percent of the 
MHS there is no 24/7 service available for blood exposure accidents. Besides, not 
all the institutions are willing to handle accidents, both hospitals as well as MHS. 
On a regional level only two provinces have a 100% score with respect to optimal 
services. Injured may have no access to a proper healthcare system, or only during 
office hours, or experience much inconvenience to reach an expert centre in their 
region. 
 
Performing laboratory tests 
When required, not all laboratory tests can be performed immediately in each 
institution. Round the clock immediate HIV testing is only available in 29% of the 
hospitals and in 41% of the MHS. Moreover, both hospitals and MHS report that 
even if immediate testing is supposedly available, there is no guarantee that it is 
performed immediately (22 and 19% respectively). On regional level, hospitals 
score from 50 to 83%, in three regions MHS score 100%. Strictly taken, in some 
regions there is a 50% chance that a source cannot be tested immediately, if 
indicated. The recently renewed Dutch guidelines, “Landelijke Richtlijn 
Prikaccidenten”, (only published on internet), instruct that for proper handling 
these tests are available and can be performed immediately, when necessary. [11] 
Moreover, most MHS rely on hospital and regional laboratories to perform their 
laboratory tests, making logistics even more complex. It is remarkable that in 
some regions MHS report to be able to test immediately while hospitals report this 
not to have this possibility. 
 
Availability of medication 
Timely administration of medication is essential in preventing the transmission of 
blood borne viruses. [1,2,3,11] However, not all hospitals nor all MHS have 
necessary medication in stock. If PEP is not in stock (14% hospitals and 57% 
MHS), timely administration of medication cannot be assured. 
 
Cooperation 
It is notable that 97% of MHS report to have a service agreement with hospitals 
while hospitals report to have agreements with MHS in 46%. Of the hospitals, 
42% would care to participate in a cooperation with other healthcare facilities in 
handling of blood exposure accidents and 71% of the MHS. There is a significant  
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difference in both organisations. One quarter of MHS do not consider handling of 
blood exposure accidents a public health task. This is considered the task of the 
occupational health practitioner. However, MHS depend on infrastructure of 
hospitals (laboratory testing, medication) and may experience difficulty in 
rendering optimal service to their clients in this respect. Only 3 MHS report to 
have established a 24/7 service especially for handling of blood exposure 
accidents from injured from outside the hospital. Arrangements and service 
agreements were made with local hospitals in their corresponding districts. 
 
Limitations 
The analysis of regional coverage may be biased by the fact that not all MHS 
districts follow the provincial borders, making the aggregated data for availability 
of services not 100% reliable. MHS regions may not be evenly populated, and also 
hospitals may not be evenly distributed. The survey was sent to the infection 
control practitioners in hospitals because they mostly are involved in handling of 
blood exposure accidents in their hospital. However, in some cases arrangements 
may be made without their knowing. Some institutions, both hospitals as well as 
MHS, reported not being interested in cooperation on behalf of handling blood 
exposure accidents, because they may have their own internal or external 
arrangements. This biases the will to cooperate. 
 
Conclusions 
In the Netherlands, the infrastructure for handling of blood exposure accidents is 
not sufficiently widely distributed. Specific areas may lack access to laboratory 
facilities, rapid access to PEP or experienced counsellors. It is not clear whether in 
such cases injured are adequately redirected to an expert-centre in another region, 
and what type of arrangements are made for this situation. Also civilians may have 
difficulty in finding a proper counselling facility. During office hours they can 
report themselves to hospitals or general practitioners. Overall, more arrangements 
and cooperation are essential to guarantee adequate handling in every region of the 
Netherlands. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Background 
In 2007, a new guideline for blood exposure incidents was introduced in the 
Netherlands, to standardize risk assessment and management and aiming at a 
reduction of immunoglobulins (HBIg). Accidents now have to be assigned into 
risk categories with corresponding medical interventions. 
 
Aims 
To study the consequences of the guideline on overall risk assessment and costs of  
hepatitis B (HBV) prevention. 
 
Methods 
Incidents (n=461) from both hospital as well as non-hospital healthcare workers 
and others registered in a Dutch region by a call centre in the year 2005 were 
reassessed and reclassified as no-risk, high-risk or low-risk according to the 
corresponding risk categories of the new guideline. The differences in 
classification, use of HBV immunoglobulins, source testing and the costs of the 
HBV prevention strategy were calculated. 
 
Results 
Of all incidents, 86% could be reassigned directly into the new risk categories. 
However, there was a significant shift from low- to high-risk incidents. 
Overall, administration of HBV vaccination increased and administration of HBIg 
decreased significantly, although within the group of high-risk incidents, 
administration of HBIg increased. There was no effect on the frequency of 
reference serum taken after an incident. While fewer incidents needed 
intervention, the total costs of HBV prevention still increased by 50%. Total costs 
increased by 13%, due to a shift in classification. 
 
Conclusions 
The use of the new protocol facilitated standardized risk assessment for blood 
exposure accidents. HBIg administration and source testing decreased. An 
increased proportion of high-risk classifications resulted in an increase in the 
associated costs. 
 
Key words: blood exposure incidents, hepatitis B, risk assessment, costs 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Blood exposure incidents may lead to infection with hepatitis B (HBV), hepatitis 
C (HCV) and the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) in the exposed. [1-3] In 
general, most incidents occur during work, especially in healthcare related 
settings. [3-6] Adequate risk assessment and counselling of the injured is a 
challenge because of the different nature of the incidents, the lack of a 
standardized and universally used guideline, the differences in medical 
background and attitude of counsellors and the anxiety of the injured due to the 
possible consequences of becoming infected. [3, 7-9] 
In May 2007, a new guideline to handle blood exposure incidents was introduced 
in the Netherlands. [10] It was the result of cooperation among medical 
professionals from various disciplines. The guideline was based on a review of 
existing national and international guidelines and the latest evidence with regard to 
the risk of transmission of blood-borne viruses and the prevalence of blood-borne 
viruses in the Netherlands. 
 
Three major differences distinguish the new version from previous guidelines: 
1) The risk assessment is primarily based on the classification of the incident into 
a high-, low-, or no-risk category. Risk categories are based on the kind of injury 
and the assumed amount of blood transmitted. High-risk incidents pose a risk for 
transmission of HBV, HCV and HIV; low-risk incidents, only for HBV. In all 
cases classified as ‘no risk”, no risk of transmission of any blood-borne viruses is 
assumed. In order to support an adequate and reproducible classification of 
incidents, a list of the most commonly observed blood exposure incidents was 
compiled. (Table 1) 
2) The management of incidents involving the risk of HBV transmission changed 
significantly, aiming at reducing the use of HBV immunoglobulins (HBIg). Non-
immunized persons at risk of HBV-infection now preferably receive HBV 
vaccination instead if HBIg, with the exception of those that might not respond to 
vaccination or are known non-responders. This was based on the assumption that 
with a relatively small amount of transmitted HBV and a long incubation period, 
actively immunized individuals still have enough time to develop protection. [11] 
Long term protection against HBV by active vaccination is also important for 
injured persons who may be at risk of future accidental blood exposure incidents. 
Last but not least, there is some concern about transmitting pathogens by using 
human blood products, such as HBIg. [12] However, if the source is HBV positive 
or likely to be positive, HBIg as well as HBV vaccination are administered. 
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3) For prevention of HIV in high-risk incidents when the source patient is 
unavailable for testing, one has to refer to the potential risk within known risk 
groups, if known at all, before administering post-exposure-prophylaxis (PEP). 
[10] 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of the National Guideline on Needle stick Injuries, risk assessment based on the 
nature of the injury 
Risk accident Overall estimate Risk according to virus 
  HBV HCV HIV 
1 Blood spots on intact skin None 
2 Blood spots on non-intact skin (e.g. active 
eczema or fresh scrapes) 
Low + – – 
3 Extensive contact with blood in combination 
with open wounds (e.g. stab wounds, cuts) High ++ + + 
4 Blood or blood-contaminated fluid on mucous 
membrane High ++ + + 
5 Other potentially infectious fluid on mucous 
membrane Low + – – 
6 Bite wounds, risk for the person bitten (saliva of 
perpetrator in the wound of the person bitten) Low + – – 
7 Bite wounds occurring during an fight, risk for 
the person bitten (saliva mixed with blood) High ++ + + 
8 Bite wounds, risk for perpetrator (blood of the 
person bitten on mucous membrane of the mouth 
of the perpetrator) 
High ++ + + 
9 Superficial skin injury of the victim with no 
visible blood (scratch) None    
10 Injury involving a needle used for subcutaneous 
injection (insulin/heparin) Low + – – 
11 Injury involving a needle used for 
intramuscular injection (blood from the source not 
visible) 
Low + – – 
12 Injury involving a needle used for 
intramuscular injection (blood from the source 
visible) 
High ++ + + 
13 Injury involving a suture needle used for an 
intracutaneous/subcutaneous procedure (blood 
from the source not visible) 
Low + – – 
14 Injury involving a suture needle used for a 
procedure other than those specified above or 
involving a suture needle when blood from the 
source is visible 
High ++ + + 
15 Injury involving needle or lancet used for a 
finger prick test (glucose test) High ++ + + 
16 Percutaneous injury other than those specified 
above (e.g. infusion needle, operating room 
equipment) 
High ++ + + 
Key to the symbols in table: 
– indicates negligible risk of transmission of the virus in question 
+ indicates low risk of transmission of the virus in question 
++ indicates high risk of transmission of the virus in question 
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In the Dutch region of North East Brabant, a call centre for blood exposure 
incidents handles all incidents – occurring both inside and outside hospital settings 
by telephone on a 24/7 basis. [6] The centre serves a region of 500,000 inhabitants 
and 2 major hospitals (1800 beds) and registers all incidents systematically. On an 
annual basis, approximately 450 incidents are registered. [13] 
 
To assess the consequences of the new guideline on the risk assessment and 
handling of the incidents, we re-assessed the data of one year of registration in our 
region (2005). We specifically studied the differences in risk assessment between 
the new and old guideline and whether it was possible to assign blood exposure 
incidents into an appropriate category. We also calculated whether the use of HBV 
immunoglobulins and source testing decreased. Finally, we calculated the 
differences in the costs of the HBV prevention strategy prior to and after the 
change in the guidelines. 
 
 
METHODS 
 
All incidents registered by the call centre in the year 2005 in the North Eastern 
region of Brabant were analysed with regard to risk classification and measures. 
All incidents were then reassessed (PvW and PS) and reclassified as no-risk, low-
risk or high-risk, according to the corresponding risk category of the new 
guideline. 
Three groups of injured were identified: hospital employees, non-hospital health 
care workers (HCW) and other persons. The last category includes, for example, 
law enforcement and prison workers, cleaning staff and civilians. 
Two types of incidents with suture needles and needles used for the administration 
of local anaesthetics, were analysed separately. The new guidelines assign 
incidents with these devices to different risk-categories (low- and high-risk, 
respectively) depending on whether there is visible blood on the device at the 
moment of injury. Because this was not recorded in 2005, the proportion of 
devices with visible blood in 2008 was used. 
Next to assessing the differences with regard to risk group assignment, we 
evaluated the impact of the changes with regard to HBV, HCV and HIV 
prevention. 
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Comparing the old and new guidelines, differences in the outcome of risk 
estimation were calculated (odds ratios and confidence intervals, chi-square tests 
were used to calculate p-values), as well as the difference in costs involved in 
taking the appropriate measures. Price levels of 2005 were used for HBIg, 
hepatitis B vaccination and testing HBsAg in source patients. 
For the equation of the costs between HBV measures per accident taken in 2005 
and those which should be taken according the new guideline, the Mann-Whitney 
test was used. All calculations were performed using SPSS 15. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Overall, 458 of 461 registered incidents were analysed. Of these incidents, 225 
involved hospital employees, 181 non-hospital HCWs and 52 involved other 
persons. Three records were excluded because of inadequate registration. 
 
Regarding hospital employees, 197/225 (86%) of the incidents could be reassigned 
directly into the new risk category according to the new guideline. (Table 2) In 
2005, 66 of these incidents were high-risk while this was 100 according to the new 
guideline (OR 2.05, CI95% [136 – 3.07], p<0.01) and 127 (65%) were low risk 
while this was 92 (47%) according the new guideline (OR 0.48, CI95% [0.32 – 
0.72], p<0.01). (Table 3) 
 
Table 3: Comparison of risk assessment of old versus new guideline in reassigned incidents 
 
 Data 2005     
 old guideline  new guideline     
Hospitals          
 (n = 194) n (%)  n (%) OR [CI 95%] p (χ2 test) 
no risk 1 (1)  2 (1) 0,56 [0,18 - 22,35] 0,56 
low risk 127 (65)  92 (47) 0,48 [0,32 - 0,72] < 0,01 
high risk 66 (34)  100 (52) 2,05 [1,36 - 3,07] < 0,01 
          
          
Non-hospital HCW         
 (n = 163) 
       
  
no risk 6 (4)  7 (4) 1,17 [0,39 - 3,57] 0,78 
low risk 147 (90)  122 (75) 0,32 [0,17 - 0,61] < 0,01 
high risk 10 (6)  34 (21) 4,03 [1,92 - 8,48] < 0,01 
          
        
Others         
(n = 38)          
no risk 10 (26)  10 (26) 1,00 [0,35 - 2,82] 1,00 
low risk 26 (68)  19 (50) 0,46 [0,15 - 1,13] 0,08 
high risk 2 (5)  9 (24) 5,71 [1,14 - 27,73] 0,02 
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Table 2: Incidents reassigned into new categories 
Hospital (n=225) risk estimation 2005  risk estimation new guideline   
 high-risk low-risk no-risk  high-risk low-risk no-risk  Total  
blood splashes on intact skin 0 1 1  0 1 1  2  
splashes on non-intact skin 0 2 0  0 2 0  2  
blood splash in eye 2 4 0  6 0 0  6  
saliva in mouth 0 1 0  0 1 0  1  
scratches 0 2 0  0 1 1  2  
subcutaneous needle 0 57 0  0 57 0  57  
intramuscular needle no visible blood 0 14 0  0 14 0  14  
intramuscular needle used for anaesthetic 0 14 0  8 6 0  14  
blood collection lancet 0 2 0  2 0 0  2  
suture needle 0 17 0  11 6 0  17  
intravenous needle 49 10 0  55 4 0  59  
sharp instrument with visible blood 15 3 0  18 0 0  18  
Total (%) 66 127 1  100 92 2  194 (86%) 
(%) (34%) (65%) (1%)  (52%) (47%) (1%)  (100%)  
incidents which could not be reassigned  (%) 2 25 4      31 (14%) 
(%) (6%) (81%) (15%)        
Non-hospital HCW (n=181)                  
blood splashes on intact skin 0 1 0  0 1 0  1  
blood splash in eye 1 1 0  2 0 0  2  
saliva in mouth 0 1 0  0 1 0  1  
human bite 0 3 0  0 3 0  3  
scratch 0 2 5  0 0 7  7  
subcutaneous needle 1 102 1  0 104 0  104  
intramuscular needle no visible blood 0 12 0  0 12 0  12  
suture needle  0 2 0  1 1 0  2 ** 
blood collection lancet 0 23 0  23 0 0  23   
glass with blood 2 0 0  2 0 0  2  
intravenous needle 4 0 0  4 0 0  4  
knife with blood 2 0 0  2 0 0  2  
Total (%) 10 147 6  34 122 7  163 (90%) 
(%) (6%) (90%) (4%)  (21%) (75%) (4%)  (100%)  
incidents which could not be reassigned (%) 0 18 0      18 (10%) 
(%) (0%) (100%) (0%)        
Others (n = 52)                                                                   
spit on intact skin 0 1 2  0 0 3  3  
blood on intact skin 0 0 2  0 0 2  2  
blood on non-intact skin 0 5 0  0 5 0  5  
blood in mouth 1 4 0  5 0 0  5  
Splash body fluids with no visible blood 0 0 1  0 0 1  1  
saliva in eye 0 1 0  0 1 0  1  
human bite 0 7 1  0 7 1  8  
scratch 0 0 3  0 0 3  3  
subcutaneous needle 0 3 1  0 4 0  4  
intramuscular needle no visible blood 0 2 0  0 2 0  2  
blood collection lancet 0 2 0  2 0 0  2  
intravenous needle 1 0 0  1 0 0  1  
Cut with blood on glass 0 1 0  1 0 0  1  
Total (%) 2 26 10  9 19 10  38 (73%) 
(%) (5%) (68%) (26%)  (24%) (50%) (26%)  (100%)  
incidents which could not be reassigned 0 14 0      14 (27%) 
(%) (0%) (100%) (0%)      (100%)  
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While in 2005 needles used for local anaesthetic and suture needles were all 
reassigned as low-risk (31/31), according to the new guideline more of these 
incidents (19/31) should be reassigned into high-risk because of visible blood on 
the needle. The proportion between high and low risk for these incidents of the 
registration data of 2008 was 60% high-risk and 40% low-risk for anaesthetic 
needles (n=9) and 67% high-risk and 33% low-risk for suture needles (n=18). 
Twelve per cent of all the injuries in the hospital (31/225) could not be reassigned 
into a new category. These included: superficial scratches with IV used needles, 
needles of unknown origin, incidents with endoscopes and cuts with used scalpels 
or tweezers where no visible blood was involved. 
 
Regarding HCWs outside the hospital, 163/181 (90%) of the incidents could be 
reassigned into the categories of the new guideline. (Table 2) In 2005, 10 (6%) of 
these incidents were high-risk while this was 34 (21%) according the new 
guideline (OR 4.03, CI95% [1.92 – 8.48], p<0.01), and 147 (90%) were low risk, 
while this was 122 (75%) according the new guideline (OR 0.32, CI95% [0.17 – 
0.61], p<0.01). (Table 3) The reassigning of incidents involving blood collection 
lancets from low-risk to high-risk was entirely responsible for this shift in risk. 
Ten per cent of the injuries such as dental sharp devices with no visible blood and 
superficial scratches with IV used needles, could not be reassigned into new 
categories. 
 
Regarding non-HCWs outside the hospital, 35/52 (67%) of the incidents could be 
reassigned into the categories of the new guideline. (Table 2) In 2005, 2 (5%) of 
these incidents were high-risk while this was 9 (24%) according the new guideline 
(OR 5.71, CI95% [1.14 – 27.73], p=0.02), and 26 (68%) were low risk, while this 
was 19 (50%) according the new guideline (OR 0.46, CI95% [0.15 – 1.13], 
p=0.08). Twenty-seven per cent of the injuries, such as needles of unknown origin 
and razor blades, could not be reassigned into new categories.  
In all low-risk incidents, significantly fewer HBIg, 8/290 (6%) vs. 55/357 (15%), 
and consequently more HBV vaccinations, 95/290 (33%) vs. 77/357 (22%), were 
administered. In high-risk incidents, significantly more HBIg (15% versus 3%) 
and more HBV vaccinations (22% vs. 4%, not significant) had to be administered. 
The new protocol had no effect on the reference serum taken after an incident, this 
was 10% in both high-risk groups, respectively, however the total administration 
of HBIg decreased significantly. (Table 4) 
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Costs of HBV prevention 
Applying the new guideline to hospital incidents, fewer incidents needed 
intervention but the total costs of HBV prevention increased by 50% from 1690 to 
2535 Euro. The mean costs per intervention increased significantly from €93.89 to 
€149.12 for hospital HCWs. In non-hospital HCWs the need for intervention 
increased slightly (74 instead of 72 interventions) when applying the new 
guideline. Total costs increased by 13% and the mean costs increased from 
€109.45 to €148.78 per intervention. For non-HCW, more interventions were 
needed (31 instead of 20). The total costs decreased by 16%, while the mean cost 
per intervention increased from €133.58 to €148.50. (Table 5) 
 
 
  
 Ta
bl
e 
4:
 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ta
ke
n
 
in
 
20
05
 
a
n
d 
a
cc
o
rd
in
g 
n
ew
 
gu
id
el
in
e 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20
05
 
 
 
 
n
ew
 
gu
id
el
in
e 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
χ2
 
te
st
 
m
ea
su
re
s 
in
 
ri
sk
 
gr
o
u
ps
 
(n
=
45
8) 
 
 
n
 
(%
) 
 
 
n
 
(%
) 
 
O
R
 
[ 9
5%
CI
 
] 
p 
N
o
 
ri
sk
 
 
 
21
 
(5)
 
 
24
 
(5)
 
 
1,
15
 
[0
,
63
 
-
 
2,
10
] 
0,
65
 
 
n
o
t H
BV
 
im
m
u
n
iz
ed
 
 
14
 
(67
) 
 
15
 
(63
) 
 
0,
83
 
[0
,
24
 
-
 
2,
84
] 
0,
77
 
Lo
w
-
ri
sk
 
 
 
35
7 
(78
) 
 
29
0 
(63
) 
 
0,
49
 
[0
,
37
 
-
 
0,
65
] 
<
0,
01
 
 
n
o
t H
BV
 
im
m
u
n
iz
ed
 
 
11
6 
(32
) 
 
95
 
(33
) 
 
1,
01
 
[0
,
73
 
-
 
1,
41
] 
0,
94
 
 
 
in
jur
ed
 
ag
e 
>
 
50
,
 
n
o
t i
m
m
u
n
iz
ed
 
 
 
18
 
(6)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
B
sA
g 
te
st
ed
 
in
 
so
u
rc
e 
 
46
 
(13
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
so
u
rc
e 
H
B
sA
g 
po
sit
iv
e 
 
3 
(1)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
B
Ig
 
ad
m
in
ist
er
ed
 
 
55
 
(15
) 
 
18
 
(6)
 
 
0,
36
 
[0
,
21
 
 
-
 
0,
63
] 
<
0,
01
 
 
H
B
V
 
v
ac
ci
n
at
io
n
 
ad
m
in
ist
er
ed
 
 
77
 
(22
) 
 
95
 
(33
) 
 
1,
77
 
[1
2,
46
 
-
 
2,
52
] 
<
0,
01
 
 
an
ti 
H
B
s 
te
st
ed
 
 
29
 
(8)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
re
fe
re
n
ce
 
se
ru
m
 
 
1 
(0)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
ig
h-
ri
sk
 
 
 
 
80
 
(17
) 
 
14
5 
(32
) 
 
2,
35
 
[1
,
72
 
-
 
3,
20
] 
<
0,
01
 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
H
B
V
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n
o
t H
BV
 
im
m
u
n
iz
ed
 
 
7 
(9)
 
 
22
 
(15
) 
 
1,
87
 
[0
,
76
 
-
 
4,
58
] 
0,
17
 
 
H
B
sA
g 
te
st
ed
 
in
 
so
u
rc
e 
 
4 
(5)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
B
Ig
 
ad
m
in
ist
er
ed
 
 
3 
(4)
 
 
22
 
(15
) 
 
4,
59
 
[1
,
33
 
-
 
15
,8
6]
 
<
0,
01
 
 
H
B
V
 
v
ac
ci
n
at
io
n
 
ad
m
in
ist
er
ed
 
 
4 
(5)
 
 
22
 
(15
) 
 
3,
40
 
[1
,
13
 
-
 
10
,2
4]
 
0,
02
 
 
an
ti 
H
B
s 
te
st
ed
 
 
5 
(6)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
H
CV
/H
IV
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
so
u
rc
e 
kn
o
w
n
 
 
76
 
(95
) 
 
13
0 
(90
) 
 
0,
46
 
[0
,
15
 
-
 
1,
42
] 
0,
17
 
 
H
CV
 
te
st
ed
 
in
 
so
u
rc
e 
 
68
 
(85
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
CV
 
po
sit
iv
e 
 
0 
(0)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
IV
 
te
st
ed
 
in
 
so
u
rc
e 
 
68
 
(85
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
IV
 
po
sit
iv
e 
 
1 
(1)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PE
P 
 
 
1 
(1)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
re
fe
re
n
ce
 
se
ru
m
 
 
 
8 
(10
) 
 
 
15
 
(10
) 
 
 
1,
04
 
[0
,
42
 
-
 
2,
57
] 
0,
94
 
m
ea
su
re
s 
in
 
to
ta
l 
 
45
8 
 
 
45
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n
o
t H
BV
 
im
m
u
n
iz
ed
 
 
13
7 
(30
) 
 
13
2 
(29
) 
 
0,
94
9 
[0
,
71
 
-
 
1,
26
] 
0,
72
 
 
 
in
jur
ed
 
ag
e 
>
 
50
,
 
n
o
t i
m
m
u
n
iz
ed
 
 
 
18
 
(4)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
B
sA
g 
te
st
ed
 
in
 
so
u
rc
e 
 
50
 
(11
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
B
Ig
 
ad
m
in
ist
er
ed
 
 
58
 
(13
) 
 
40
 
(9)
 
 
0,
66
 
[0
,
43
 
-
 
1,
01
] 
0,
05
 
 
H
B
V
 
v
ac
ci
n
at
io
n
 
ad
m
in
ist
er
ed
 
 
81
 
(18
) 
 
11
7 
(26
) 
 
1,
59
 
[1
,
16
 
-
 
2,
20
] 
<
0,
01
 
 
A
n
ti-
H
B
s 
te
st
ed
 
 
34
 
(7)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
re
fe
re
n
ce
 
se
ru
m
 
 
9 
(2)
 
 
15
 
(3)
 
 
1,
68
9 
[0
,
73
 
-
 
3,
90
] 
0,
22
 
  
 
Ta
bl
e 
5:
 
C
o
st
s 
H
BV
 
pr
ev
en
tio
n
 
fo
r 
hi
gh
 
a
n
d 
lo
w
 
ri
sk
 
in
ci
de
n
ts
 
in
 
20
05
 
v
er
su
s 
n
ew
 
gu
id
el
in
e 
  
 
 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n
s 
co
st
s 
 
 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n
s 
co
st
s 
 
 
 
 
 
pr
ic
e 
(€)
 
20
05
 
20
05
 
(€)
 
 
 
n
ew
 
n
ew
 
(€)
 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
 
P*
 
H
o
sp
ita
l (
n
=
22
5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ca
se
s 
w
ith
 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n
 
 
 
18
 
 
 
 
14
 
 
 
 
 
H
B
Ig
 
 
14
5 
2 
29
0 
 
 
3 
43
5 
 
 
 
H
B
V
 
v
ac
ci
n
at
io
n
 
 
15
0 
8 
12
00
 
 
 
14
 
21
00
 
 
 
 
te
st
 
H
B
sA
g 
 
25
 
8 
20
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to
ta
l i
n
te
rv
en
tio
n
s 
an
d 
co
st
s 
 
 
18
 
16
90
 
 
 
17
 
25
35
 
15
0%
 
 
 
m
ea
n
 
co
st
s 
pe
r 
ca
se
 
w
ith
 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n
 
 
93
.
89
 
 
 
 
18
1.
07
 
19
3%
 
 
 
m
ea
n
 
co
st
s 
pe
r 
ac
ci
de
n
t 
 
 
 
7.
51
 
 
 
 
11
.
27
 
15
0%
 
 
<
 
0.
01
 
N
o
n
-
ho
sp
ita
l H
C
W
 
(n
=
18
1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ca
se
s 
w
ith
 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n
 
 
 
72
 
 
 
 
74
 
 
 
 
 
H
B
Ig
 
 
14
5 
32
 
46
40
 
 
 
24
 
34
80
 
 
 
 
H
B
V
 
v
ac
ci
n
at
io
n
 
 
15
0 
49
 
73
50
 
 
 
74
 
11
10
0 
 
 
 
te
st
 
H
B
sA
g 
 
25
 
37
 
92
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to
ta
l i
n
te
rv
en
tio
n
s 
an
d 
co
st
s 
 
 
11
8 
12
91
5 
 
 
98
 
14
58
0 
11
3%
 
 
 
M
ea
n
 
co
st
s 
pe
r 
ca
se
 
w
ith
 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n
 
 
17
9.
38
 
 
 
 
19
7.
03
 
11
0%
 
 
 
m
ea
n
 
co
st
s 
pe
r 
ac
ci
de
n
t 
 
 
 
71
.
35
 
 
 
 
80
.
55
 
11
3%
 
 
<
 
0.
01
 
O
th
er
s 
(n
=
52
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ca
se
s 
w
ith
 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n
 
 
 
20
 
 
 
 
31
 
 
 
 
 
H
B
Ig
 
 
14
5 
24
 
34
80
 
 
 
12
 
17
40
 
 
 
 
H
B
V
 
v
ac
ci
n
at
io
n
 
 
15
0 
23
 
34
50
 
 
 
28
 
42
00
 
 
 
 
te
st
 
H
B
sA
g 
 
25
 
6 
15
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To
ta
l i
n
te
rv
en
tio
n
s 
an
d 
co
st
s 
 
 
53
 
70
80
 
 
 
40
 
59
40
 
84
%
 
 
 
m
ea
n
 
co
st
s 
pe
r 
ca
se
 
w
ith
 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n
 
 
35
4.
00
 
 
 
 
19
1.
61
 
54
%
 
 
 
m
ea
n
 
co
st
s 
pe
r 
ac
ci
de
n
t 
 
 
 
13
6.
15
 
 
 
 
11
4.
23
 
84
%
 
 
<
 
0.
01
 
*
 
M
a
n
n
-
W
ith
n
ey
 
te
st
 
C
o
st
 
pr
ic
es
 
o
f 2
00
5 
N
o
t c
a
lc
u
la
te
d:
 
hi
gh
-
ri
sk
 
a
cc
id
en
ts
 
te
st
 
H
B
sA
g 
in
st
ea
d 
o
f a
dm
in
ist
er
in
g 
H
B
Ig
  
 
 
IMPACT OF A NEW GUIDELINE 
 
 
 
108
DISCUSSION 
 
Introduction 
In the Netherlands, a new guideline has been developed to standardize the 
management of accidental exposures to blood. The new guideline is based on the 
assumption that minor incidents only pose a risk of HBV transmission and on the 
assumption that there is a significant risk of HBV, HCV and HIV transmission if a 
substantial or visible amount of blood is involved. [10] The aim of the guideline 
was to simplify assessment and handling by assigning accidents into risk 
categories with corresponding measures in a standardized manner. The new Dutch 
guideline also aimed at a reduction of the use of HB immunoglobulins. 
The new guideline is based on a review of existing national and international 
guidelines, the knowledge of the risk of transmission of blood-borne viruses and 
the prevalence of blood-borne viruses in the Netherlands. [14,15] It was also 
endorsed by different medical professionals involved in handling blood exposure 
accidents. 
Using the registered data of one year (2005) from our needle-stick counselling 
centre, the new protocol was analysed on feasibility and usability and its effect on 
the management of blood exposure accidents. Using registered data from both 
inside and outside the hospital gave us the opportunity to assess the impact of the 
new guideline in different occupational, as well as non-occupational, settings. 
However, not all data of 2005 were sufficiently complete for the assessment of 
HCV and HIV in case they were categorized into a high-risk instead of a low-risk 
category. 
 
Risk assessment and categories 
Overall, applying the new protocol, 83% of all incidents registered in 2005 could 
be adequately assigned into categories, whereas 17% did not fit into any of the 
suggested categories. 
Of all incidents, in the hospital 14% and in non-hospital health care settings 10% 
could not be reassigned into risk categories. Using the new guideline, difficulty in 
the categorization occurred when devices less commonly used in a health care 
setting were involved, such as biopsy needles or diathermia needles. Solid devices 
that did not carry visible blood were also difficult to categorize. In previous 
guidelines these were categorized as low risk, whereas the new guideline 
categorizes them as high risk (in dubio pro). In places like dentist’s practices and 
general practitioners offices, less well-defined devices are used. 
Of incidents occurring in non-healthcare workers, 27% could not be assigned into 
categories. The majority of these incidents, (21%), were caused by stray needles of 
unknown origin. According to the new guideline, these should be assessed  
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according to the circumstances in which the accident took place and whether the 
needle might have been recently used by someone from a high-risk group. 
A large amount of sharp devices is available for medical use that are not 
specifically mentioned in the guideline (Table 1). This makes it more difficult to 
assign all these devices into the three categories. Using the presence of visible 
blood on the instrument would appear a logical step to help in assigning the 
incidents. Now this procedure is only recommended for intramuscular injection 
needles and suture needles. 
Shift in risk: In the reassigned incidents, a significant shift occurred from low- to 
high-risk categories in all 3 groups. This means that more measures have to be 
taken after assessing the risk of an accident. If an accident is assigned as low risk 
and the injured person appears to be HBV immunized, no follow-up measures are 
necessary and the case can be closed. In high-risk accidents, the risks of HCV and 
HIV infection also have to be assessed. Eventually, this will lead to more 
laboratory testing, more time investment both for the injured as well as the 
counsellor and therefore, to more costs. Experience in the assessment of blood 
exposure accidents, even with a detailed guideline, remains essential to prevent 
unnecessary measures and costs. [16] 
 
HBV handling and the use of immunoglobulins 
The new protocol makes the assessment and handling of HBV risk easier. When 
an accident is assigned into a low-risk category the victim can be vaccinated on 
the following working day, after contra-indications like high age (>50 years) or 
immune deprivation are excluded. [11] This means there is more time available 
and measures can be taken during office hours. In that case, testing the source for 
HBsAg is not needed. This will lead to a reduction of the administration of HBIg. 
If the injured do have a reduced immune response, in order to avoid HBIg 
administration, it is recommended to test for HBsAg in the source. 
In our study, overall less HBIg had to be administered. While in 2005, 55 victims 
of low-risk accidents were entitled to HBIg administration, this decreased to 18 
according to the new guideline. All these cases were attributed to age of the 
injured party. In high-risk accidents 3 injured persons received HBIg in 2005, 
while according to the new guideline, 22 should receive protection by HBIg. 
However, if the source patient nevertheless has to be tested for HCV and HIV, 
testing for HBsAg as well could prevent unnecessary HBIg administration. 
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Extra laboratory testing 
In 2005, in 85% of all cases the sources were known and therefore potentially 
available for testing. [13] Testing the source can prevent unnecessary 
administration of post-exposure prophylaxis in difficult to assess cases and in 
cases with a victim that might not respond to vaccination or is a known non-
responder. Testing the source, if possible, could also reduce potential anxiety in 
the injured. [8] 
 
Costs of HBV prevention 
The mean costs of HBV prevention per accident increased in hospital (50%) and 
non-hospital HCW (13%), while it decreased in others (16%). This was mainly 
caused by the increased costs of administration of HBV vaccination compared to 
the administration of HBIg only, and the increased number of high-risk accidents. 
In hospitals, the costs per accident are lower, due to the high HBV vaccination 
levels of hospital employees. 
In this study only the direct costs of administering HBIg, HBV vaccination and 
HBsAg testing could be calculated. The costs of counselling and logistics were not 
taken into account. 
Due to more high-risk assessments in all three groups, relatively more costs are 
generated for the administration of HBIg. Source testing for HBsAg must be 
performed if possible, to prevent unnecessary HBIg administration and save costs. 
The higher mean cost per accident for non-hospital HCW is caused by lower 
vaccination levels in these HCWs. A HCW having undergone a blood exposure 
accident has proven to be at risk and should therefore be vaccinated. Employees 
working in medical professions in the Netherlands are entitled to HBV 
vaccination. [17] Thus, high levels of HBV vaccination coverage in risk groups 
are ultimately more cost-effective. 
 
Conclusions 
By using the new guideline for blood exposure accidents, accidents can be more 
easily assigned into a risk-category and therefore the new protocol facilitates a 
proper, standardized risk assessment. Standardization could also make it possible 
for different hospitals or regions to compare data and assess quality of treatment. 
Risk categories may be further specified and more specifications could be given 
for accidents that cannot presently be assigned directly.  
The use of HBIg and source testing and therefore the associated costs, decrease 
when using the new guideline. For the adequate handling of blood exposure 
accidents, experience in counselling remains important. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the past, the management of blood exposure accidents has never been a high 
priority in the Netherlands. After the emergence of HIV in the 80s, a number of 
Dutch studies showed that the risk of acquiring HIV for healthcare workers 
working with people with HIV was low. Hepatitis B prevalence has always been 
low in the Netherlands. The prevalence of hepatitis C, measured from the 90s 
when diagnostic serology became available, has also been low. However, in the 
late 80s and 90s, a number of studies, especially from the US, revealed that 
healthcare workers were highly at risk of being involved in blood exposure 
accidents during work. Even though a single accident in itself contains a low risk, 
the sheer number of all these accidents creates a considerable accumulated risk. 
Moreover, surveillance by registration programmes like Epinet showed that many 
occupational needle-stick accidents could have been prevented. This eventually 
led to the Needle-stick Safety and Prevention Act in 2000, in which healthcare 
employers were obliged to use only safety-engineered devices. Several European 
countries like the United Kingdom and Spain have followed this example. 
In the Netherlands, the only national measure taken to prevent certain risk groups 
from becoming infected with hepatitis B are national HBV vaccination 
programmes targeted at persons at risk. Due to the lack of standardisation in the 
handling of needle-stick incidents, in 2002, in the region of north-east Brabant, 
there was a great need for a routine protocol and proper logistics for the 
management of blood exposure accidents. This led to the establishment of a 24/7 
available expert centre serving all occupational institutions and civilians and was 
supported by local hospitals and MHS. 
 
The aim of this thesis was to evaluate the impact of the regional expert centre on 
blood exposure incidents and different quality aspects. This was addressed by 
studying different aspects of the management of blood exposure accidents, both by 
the expert centre as well as in other national settings with different approaches.  
 
 
RISKS AND ANXIETY 
The actual risk involved in becoming infected with a blood-borne virus after a 
blood exposure accident in the Netherlands is relatively low. Nevertheless, blood 
exposure accidents may still have a high impact on the injured. Even with low 
risk, the possibility of becoming infected can cause major stress in the injured. 
Proper risk assessment and patient information for the victim can prevent 
unnecessary anxiety. (Chapter 2) 
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OCCURRENCE 
We analysed the occurrence of accidents in several occupational settings. Many 
accidents are not being reported and therefore, the real number of accidents may 
be considerably higher than is registered. 
Different occupational sectors have far more accidents and risks than is shown in 
present registrations. For each of these sectors, specific preventive measures can 
be developed related to the risks involved. (Chapters 2 and 3) 
 
 
MANAGEMENT 
Professionals with different (medical) backgrounds tend to evaluate the risks of 
blood exposure accidents differently; the risks may be over- or underrated. 
(Chapter 6) Not only should risk assessment and the administration of medication 
be done uniformly, but also the information and care given should be consistent, 
regardless of the background of the counsellor. Protocols that are developed 
should aim at standardised care, to help counsellors with proper advice. The recent 
national protocol can provide more standardised care for blood exposure incidents 
and will also enable us to assess the quality of the care given in the Netherlands in 
this respect. National surveillance will provide more data for the prevention of 
blood exposure accidents. These data can also be used to improve the protocol. 
(Chapter 8) 
 
The lack of infrastructure in certain areas in the Netherlands may be harmful for 
the patients involved, especially when urgent laboratory testing is needed or post-
exposure prophylaxis has to be administered. (Chapter 7) Regional healthcare 
institutions should recognise these problems and work together to establish a 
facility in which care for the injured can be given 24/7. Either initiated by the local 
hospital, the municipal health service or an occupational health service, as long as 
the management of accidents is guaranteed 24/7.  Cooperation among healthcare 
institutions is essential for a successful work-up of logistics. 
 
Employers lack awareness of the risks to which their employees are exposed and 
have to take responsibility according to these risks (Chapter 2). The Dutch 
occupational law (Arbobesluit 4.87) is clear about the employers’ obligation to 
take all possible measures to prevent employees from exposure, as far as this is 
technically possible. Hepatitis B vaccination programmes should be carefully 
monitored and executed and employees should be frequently alerted to the 
possible dangers of blood-borne viruses to which they may be exposed. Blood 
exposure accidents may also create agitation on work floors and even sick leave, 
both as a result of a recent accident as well as a general feeling of unsafety. 
Employers should also register all blood exposure accidents in their institutions. 
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This is not only to check whether the appropriate measures are taken after an 
accident, but also to monitor if preventive actions are necessary in the future. 
Several studies have shown that a significant reduction of accidents in healthcare 
facilities is possible by using safer equipment. The Dutch labour inspectorate 
could play a more active role in showing employers their responsibilities. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Both occupational and non-occupational blood exposure accidents occur 
frequently in the Netherlands. 
The present Dutch guideline standardises the risk assessment and management of 
blood exposure accidents. However, the experience of the counsellor in handling 
blood exposure accidents still remains important. 
A regional expert counselling centre has proven to have many advantages: it can 
be staffed by experienced counsellors and it is accessible 24/7, it can monitor the 
quality of its treatment and make adjustments when necessary and it can make use 
of a proper infrastructure. 
 
Nationally, more awareness has to be created to prevent blood exposure accidents. 
Employers and employees have to be convinced of the importance of reporting 
accidents. Surveillance is essential, both for the development of prevention 
strategies as well as for the evaluation of the present protocol. 
More can be done on the national level: employers have to be motivated to 
facilitate the proper handling of blood exposure accidents in their institutions. 
They also have to take more notice of the dangers in their work places and take 
measures accordingly. HBV vaccination and safe equipment have to be actively 
offered. Supervising the compliance of employers with occupational safety laws 
may take place via the labour inspectorate. 
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Chapter 1 offers an introduction in the management of blood exposure accidents. 
Three general topics are discussed. The first part describes the risks and 
background of blood exposure accidents. The definition of a blood exposure 
accident is given and the risk of getting infected by a blood-borne virus is 
discussed. Furthermore the settings in which a blood exposure accident can occur 
are elaborated. The second part discusses the assessment and counselling. The 
three risk categories in which the accidents can be assigned are described as is the 
importance of proper counselling to reduce anxiety and stress for the injured. In 
the third part the establishment of the expert counselling centre and methods to 
analyse the quality of the management of blood exposure accidents are described. 
 
Chapter 2 presents an analysis of blood exposure accidents and the risk estimates 
for occupational groups in the Netherlands. Also, the costs of handling of blood 
exposure accidents were calculated. The main objective was to evaluate the 
current prevention policies and data on the incidence and associated medical costs 
of occupational blood exposure accidents in the Netherlands. It was estimated that 
each year, 13,000-15,000 blood exposure accidents are reported in the 
Netherlands, of which 95% occur in occupational settings. HBV vaccination is 
offered free of charge only to people in risk groups, and the seroprevalence of 
hepatitis B (HBV), hepatitis C (HCV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 
is low. National surveillance programs show that only few infections are related to 
blood exposure accidents. High-risk accidents occur mainly in hospitals. In 
nursing homes and home care settings, the majority of the accidents are low-risk. 
Only limited data are available about occurrence of accidents in other occupational 
groups. The associated medical costs from occupational blood exposure accidents 
are mainly determined by the initial risk management. 
It was concluded that accidents must be managed effectively to prevent infection 
and reduce anxiety in injured employees. While strategies to reduce HCV and HIV 
infection should primarily aim at reducing the occurrence of high-risk accidents, 
vaccination can prevent from HBV infection and also cut the costs of handling 
low-risk accidents. The implementation of vaccination strategies, safe working 
policies and the proper use of safe equipment should be better monitored. 
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In chapter 3 an analyses of all registered blood exposure accidents in the first year 
of the expert centre is reported. In total, in 2003, 454 accidents were registered of 
which 234 occurred in the hospital and 220 outside of the hospital (community). 
Almost all accidents (95%), occurred during work conditions and most (84%) 
occurred in healthcare. In hospital, this was mostly medical staff (13%), nursing 
staff (45%), operating staff (13%), and auxiliary staff, like cleaning (18%) and 
others (10%). Outside the hospital this were HCW (48%), prison staff en police 
(10%), general practitioners, dentists and their staff (8%) cleaners (4%) and other 
occupational professions (7%), and 10% in civilians. 
Accidents were classified as high risk, low risk and no risk accidents. High risk 
accidents mainly occurred in the hospital setting while low risk accidents mainly 
occurred in the community. The hepatitis B vaccination level in the injured outside 
the hospital appeared to be much lower than in the hospital (38 versus 96%). 
Injured inside the hospital reported their accidents more quickly. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the reasoning for the classification of risk categories of 
different blood exposure accidents. Three risk categories were identified: high-risk 
accidents, which pose a risk for both hepatitis B, hepatitis C en HIV, low-risk 
accidents, which pose a risk only for transmission of hepatitis B, and, no-risk 
accidents, where no risk for transmission of any blood born virus is involved. 
After one year of registration, all accidents from this period were analysed for 
adherence to the standard protocol. Despite the classification more than 30% of 
the recorded accidents were not handled according to the protocol. Following the 
protocol appeared mainly different outside the hospital setting. Breaches consisted 
of overreaction as well as an insufficient response. Reasons for not sticking to the 
protocol were, injured who reported to late, low risk estimation of both expert 
centre and injured, unwillingness of the injured to cooperate or, on the contrary, 
extreme anxiety. 
Continuous monitoring of the performance of the counselling centre has proved to 
be valuable, if not essential, to the quality of performance and has led to changes 
and adaptations in the standardized protocol. However, using standardized 
operational procedures and flowcharts to handle accidental blood exposure 
remains difficult, especially as the anxiety of recipients is often high and the time 
in which to handle the problem is limited. 
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Chapter 5 consists of an longitudinal analysis of all blood exposure incidents 
throughout 2003-2005 registered by the expert telephone centre in order to assess 
quality improvement. 
We analysed response time of reporting by exposed, the turn-around time in which 
a HIV test could be accomplished when needed, occurrence of injuries, HBV 
vaccination level of the exposed, and the adherence to the protocol by members of 
the expert centre. 
 
On average 465 reports were registered per year, 50% took place in the 
community and 33% of the reports were outside office hours. HIV tests were 
progressively faster performed during the registration period due to earlier 
reporting and improvement of logistics. HBV vaccination level in healthcare 
workers outside the hospital increased from 34% to 70% during the three years. 
Consequently, the administration of immunoglobulines and unnecessary 
laboratory testing was reduced. No PEP had to be administered unnecessary. In 
assessing the quality of the expert centre, in 2003, flaws in the handling were 
identified in 37% of the cases, compared to 8% in 2005. 
Handling of blood exposure incidents should logistically also be optimised outside 
office hours and outside hospitals. The establishment of a 24/7 centralised 
counselling facility for handling of blood exposures resulted in significant 
improvements and better care. 
 
In chapter 6, a study to reveal differences between diverse groups of counsellors 
in assessing the same blood exposure incidents is reported. 
Subjects included 4 different kinds of counsellors: public health physicians from 
infectious disease departments and medical microbiologists, occupational health 
practitioners and HIV/AIDS specialists from hospital settings. 
Surveys with cases of blood exposure incidents were sent to the counsellors in The 
Netherlands asking questions about their risk assessment and consequent 
treatment. Questions were categorized for Hepatitis B virus (HBV), hepatitis C 
virus (HCV) and HIV risks. 
In general, occupational health practitioners and medical microbiologists showed a 
more rigorous approach especially with regard to prophylactic treatment when 
counselling HBV risk situations, whereas public health physicians and HIV/AIDS 
specialists were more thorough in the handling of HCV risk accidents. In HIV 
counselling, HIV/AIDS specialists were far more rigorous in their treatment than 
the other groups. 
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The assessment of blood exposures significantly differs depending on the medical 
background of the counsellor handling the incident, leading to remarkable 
inconsistencies in the response to prevent the transmission of blood-borne 
pathogens and/or to increased costs for unnecessary diagnostic tests and 
preventive measures. 
Different reasons were given why counsellors would make different assessments: 
occupational health practitioners would be more restrictive due to pressure of 
occupational law and HIV/Aids specialists would be consulted more often when 
significant risk for HIV transmission is involved. Also anxiety of injured can 
influence the risk estimation of the counsellor. 
While national guidelines for the counselling and treatment of blood exposure 
incidents are essential, the assessment of blood exposure incidents should be 
limited to as few as possible, well trained professionals, operating in regional or 
national call centres, to ensure comparable assessment and corresponding 
application of preventive measures for all victims. 
 
Chapter 7 describes the study whether victims of blood exposure accidents can 
have access to proper treatment in the Netherlands. Questionnaires were sent to all 
hospitals and Municipal Health Services (MHS) in the Netherlands to assess the 
infrastructure for handling of blood exposure accidents, the performance of 
necessary laboratory tests, the administration of preventive medication and the 
backup facility. 
Questionnaires were returned by 82% of the institutions. Seventy-four percent of 
the hospitals and 71% of MHS handle blood exposure accidents from outside their 
own institution. Necessary laboratory tests are not always available or sometimes 
cannot be performed on an immediate basis. Medication is not always directly 
available. MHS see more advantage in cooperation than hospitals. 
Despite positive intentions of most organisations there is no guarantee that victims 
of blood exposure accidents in the Netherlands can have access to proper care on 
any place in the Netherlands on a 24/7 basis. 
We recommend improving infrastructure and initiating cooperation by health care 
organisations to guarantee adequate handling in every region. Moreover 
occupational health services should play a more active role in improving services 
for handling of blood exposure accidents. 
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In Chapter 8, the impact of the new guideline on changes with regard to the risk 
classification and costs was evaluated using data from one year of registration of 
the expert counselling centre in Northeast Brabant (2005). All data were 
reassessed and reassigned into the risk categories proposed by the new Dutch 
guideline. Costs of prevention of HBV infection were calculated for the old and 
new situation. Of all accidents, 83% could be reassigned directly into the new 
categories. Specific medical devices could often not be categorized. The presence 
of visible blood on the device seems a logical factor to assign an accident into a 
high-risk category. The new protocol makes assessment and handling of HBV risk 
easier. Less HBIg had to be administered. Still the mean costs of HBV prevention 
per accident increased, mainly due to increased costs of administration of HBV 
vaccination compared to administration of HBIg only, and the increased number 
of high-risk accidents. 
By using the new guideline for blood exposure accidents, accidents can be more 
easily assigned into a risk-category and therefore facilitate a proper standardized 
risk assessment. Risk-categories may be further specified and more specifications 
could be given for accidents which can not be assigned directly. For adequate 
handling of blood exposure accidents, experience in counselling remains 
important. 
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Hoofdstuk 1 is een inleiding in de afhandeling van prikaccidenten. Drie algemene 
thema's worden besproken. Het eerste deel beschrijft de risico's en de achtergrond 
van prikaccidenten. Er wordt een definitie van een prikaccident gegeven en de 
kans op besmetting met een bloedoverdraagbaar virus wordt besproken. 
Vervolgens worden de plaatsen waar prikaccidenten kunnen gebeuren besproken. 
Het tweede deel behandelt de beoordeling en advisering. De drie 
risicocategorieën, hoog-, laag-, en geen risico,  waarin de ongevallen kunnen 
worden ingedeeld, worden beschreven. Verder wordt het belang van een goede 
begeleiding van de verwonde om angst en stress te voorkomen besproken. In het 
derde deel worden de oprichting van het meldpunt prikaccidenten in Noordoost 
Brabant en de methoden voor het analyseren van de kwaliteit van het afhandelen 
van prikaccidenten beschreven. 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijft een analyse van prikaccidenten en de risico’s voor 
verschillende beroepsgroepen in Nederland. Ook worden de kosten van de 
afhandeling van prikaccidenten berekend. De belangrijkste doelstelling van deze 
studie was de evaluatie van het huidige Nederlandse beleid en het verzamelen van 
gegevens over de incidentie van prikaccidenten en de daarmee samenhangende 
medische kosten van beroepsmatige blootstelling aan prikaccidenten in Nederland. 
Er werd geschat dat elk jaar 13000-15000 prikaccidenten worden gerapporteerd in 
Nederland, waarvan 95% vanuit de gezondheidszorg. Hepatitis B-vaccinatie wordt 
alleen gratis aangeboden aan mensen in risicogroepen, en de seroprevalentie van 
hepatitis B (HBV), hepatitis C (HCV) en het humaan immunodeficiëntie virus 
(hiv) is laag. Uit nationale surveillanceprogramma's blijkt dat slechts weinig 
infecties gerelateerd zijn aan prikaccidenten. Hoog-risico-accidenten vinden 
vooral in ziekenhuizen plaats. In verpleeghuizen en thuiszorginstellingen valt het 
merendeel van de accidenten in een laag-risico-categorie. Er zijn slechts beperkte 
gegevens beschikbaar over het vóórkomen van prikaccidenten in andere 
beroepsgroepen. De bijbehorende medische kosten van beroepsmatige 
blootstelling aan prikaccidenten worden voornamelijk bepaald door de 
afhandeling hiervan. 
Geconcludeerd wordt dat de afhandeling van prikaccidenten goed moet worden 
geregeld, om infecties te voorkomen én om angst bij de verwonde werknemers te 
verminderen. Terwijl maatregelen tegen HCV en hiv-infectie in de eerste plaats 
gericht zijn op het verminderen van hoog-risico-accidenten, kan vaccinatie 
effectief beschermen tegen HBV infectie en daarmee ook tegen de kosten van de 
behandeling van laag-risico ongevallen. De uitvoering van het HBV 
vaccinatiebeleid, het creëren van een veilige werkomgeving en het juiste gebruik 
van veilige apparatuur en instrumentarium moeten beter worden gecontroleerd. 
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In hoofdstuk 3 is een analyse beschreven van alle geregistreerde prikaccidenten 
uit het eerste jaar van het bestaan van het meldpunt. In totaal werden in 2003 454 
accidenten geregistreerd, waarvan 234 uit het ziekenhuis en 220 van buiten het 
ziekenhuis. Bijna alle accidenten (95%), vonden plaats tijdens werkzaamheden en 
de meeste (84%) in de gezondheidszorg. In het ziekenhuis was dit bij medisch 
personeel (13%), verplegend personeel (45%), ondersteunend personeel (13%) en 
helpenden, zoals schoonmakers (18%) en anderen (10%). Buiten het ziekenhuis 
waren het vooral verzorgenden (48%), gevangenispersoneel en politie (10%), 
huisartsen, tandartsen en hun personeel (8%), schoonmaakpersoneel (4%) en 
andere beroepsgroepen (7%), en 10% burgers. 
Accidenten werden ingeschat als hoog-risico, laag-risico en geen-risico voor bloed 
overdraagbare aandoeningen. Hoog-risico-accidenten kwamen vooral voor in het 
ziekenhuis, terwijl laag-risico-accidenten vooral buiten het ziekenhuis 
voorkwamen. De hepatitis B-vaccinatiegraad bij de verwonden buiten het 
ziekenhuis bleek veel lager dan bij die in het ziekenhuis (38 versus 96%). 
Verwonden in het ziekenhuis meldden hun accidenten sneller. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft de verantwoording voor de indeling van prikaccidenten in 
risicocategorieën. Prikaccidenten werden ingedeeld in drie risicocategorieën: 
hoog-risico-accidenten, waarbij zowel een risico voor hepatitis B, hepatitis C en 
hiv bestaat, laag-risico-accidenten, die alleen een risico vormen voor de 
overdracht van hepatitis B, en geen-risico-accidenten, waarbij er geen risico 
bestaat voor de overdracht van een bloedoverdraagbaar virus. Na een jaar 
registratie werden alle accidenten uit deze periode geanalyseerd op naleving van 
het standaard protocol door het meldpunt. Ondanks de indeling werd meer dan 
30% van de geregistreerde accidenten niet afgehandeld volgens het protocol. Na 
analyse bleken die verschillen vooral door de afhandeling buiten het ziekenhuis te 
ontstaan. Afwijkingen bestonden uit zowel het uitvoeren van te veel als van te 
weinig handelingen. Redenen om zich niet te houden aan het protocol waren, dat 
verwonden zich té laat meldden, zowel meldpunt als verwonde een lage 
risicoperceptie hadden, de bronpatiënt niet bereid was om mee te werken aan 
onderzoek of een extreme angst van de melder. 
Monitoring van de prestaties van het meldpunt blijkt waardevol, zo niet essentieel, 
om de kwaliteit van afhandeling van prikaccidenten hoog te houden. Het heeft 
bovendien geleid tot veranderingen en aanpassingen in het gestandaardiseerde 
protocol. Het werken met gestandaardiseerde procedures en algoritmes om 
prikaccidenten te beoordelen blijft echter moeilijk, vooral omdat de angst van de 
verwonden vaak hoog is en de tijd waarin de afhandeling plaats moet vinden maar 
beperkt is. 
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In hoofdstuk 5 werden alle door het meldpunt geregistreerde prikaccidenten van 
2003-2005 geanalyseerd om de kwaliteit van risico-inschatting en afhandeling te 
kunnen meten. 
We analyseerden de tijd tussen ongeval en rapportage door de verwonden, de 
doorlooptijd waarin een hiv-test kan worden uitgevoerd wanneer nodig, de plaats 
waar ongevallen gebeuren, de HBV-vaccinatiegraad van de verwonden en de 
naleving van het protocol door het meldpunt. 
Gemiddeld werden 465 meldingen per jaar geregistreerd; 50% vond plaats buiten 
het ziekenhuis en 33% werd gemeld buiten kantoortijd. Hiv-tests werden 
geleidelijk sneller uitgevoerd als gevolg van snellere rapportage en verbetering 
van de logistiek. De HBV-vaccinatiegraad van werknemers in de gezondheidszorg 
buiten het ziekenhuis nam toe van 34% tot 70% gedurende de drie jaar. Daardoor 
werd de toediening van immunoglobulines en onnodige laboratoriumdiagnostiek 
verminderd. Het toedienen van post-expositie-profylaxe (PEP) uit voorzorg was 
nooit nodig. Bij de beoordeling van de kwaliteit van afhandeling door het 
meldpunt werden in 2003 nog in 37% van de gevallen tekortkomingen bij de 
afhandeling vastgesteld, in 2005 was dit nog maar in 8%. 
Voor afhandeling van prikaccidenten is het belangrijk dat de logistiek ook buiten 
kantooruren en buiten de ziekenhuizen optimaal is. De oprichting van een 24-uurs 
meldpunt voor de afhandeling van prikaccidenten leidde tot aanzienlijke 
verbetering en een betere zorg. 
 
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt een onderzoek beschreven naar verschillen in achtergrond 
van beoordelaars bij het beoordelen van prikaccidenten. Vier groepen 
beoordelaars werden in dit onderzoek in een schriftelijke enquête bevraagd over 
hoe ze met bepaalde risico-inschattingen en nazorg omgingen. De vier groepen 
waren: medisch microbiologen, Hiv/Aidsbehandelaren, bedrijfsartsen en artsen-
infectieziekten van GGD’en. Er werd gevraagd hoe ver ze gingen in gelijke 
casussen met de maatregelen die ze namen met betrekking tot het testen van 
bronnen en de behandeling en nazorg voor het slachtoffer bij een eventueel risico 
op overdracht van HBV, HCV en hiv. Over het algemeen waren bedrijfsartsen en 
medisch microbiologen strenger met betrekking tot afhandeling van HBV-risico, 
terwijl artsen-infectieziekten en Hiv/Aidsbehandelaren rigoureuzer waren met 
betrekking tot afhandeling van HCV-risico. Met betrekking tot het risico van 
overdracht van hiv waren Hiv/Aidsbehandelaren veel eerder geneigd maatregelen 
te treffen dan de andere drie groepen. Er werden verschillende redenen genoemd 
waarom deze beoordelaars verschillende inschattingen maakten: bedrijfsartsen 
zouden onder druk van de Arbo-wetgeving strengere maatregelen treffen, en 
Hiv/Aidsbehandelaren zouden vaker geconsulteerd worden als er een 
daadwerkelijk risico op Hiv-besmetting is. Ook de angstgevoelens van de 
verwonde kunnen de beoordelaar beïnvloeden. De conclusie was dat een nationaal 
  
 
 
SAMENVATTING 
 
 
127 
 
protocol voor alle beroepsgroepen de zorg voor slachtoffers van prikaccidenten 
verder kan standaardiseren, zodat iedereen dezelfde zorg krijgt. Op deze manier 
kunnen ook groepen onderling worden vergeleken. 
 
Hoofdstuk 7 beschrijft het onderzoek naar mogelijkheden voor slachtoffers van 
een prikaccident om een risico-inschatting en afhandeling van hun prikaccident te 
krijgen in Nederland. Voor dit onderzoek werd aan alle ziekenhuizen en GGD’en 
gevraagd, welke mogelijkheden tot afhandeling zij hebben, welke medicatie en 
laboratoriumtesten ze 24 uur per dag beschikbaar hebben en kunnen uitvoeren, én 
of ze bereid zijn tot samenwerking met verschillende instanties. Van alle 
instellingen reageerde 82% op de vragenlijsten. Prikaccidenten van buiten hun 
eigen instelling worden door 74% van de ziekenhuizen en door 71% van de 
GGD’en afgehandeld. Laboratoriumtests waren niet altijd voorhanden óf konden 
niet altijd onmiddellijk uitgevoerd worden. Ook medicatie was niet altijd 
aanwezig. De GGD’en zagen meer voordeel in samenwerking dan de 
ziekenhuizen. Ondanks de positieve opstelling van de meeste organisaties is er 
geen garantie dat slachtoffers van prikaccidenten 24 uur per dag toegang hebben 
tot de juiste zorg op welke plaats dan ook in Nederland. 
Onze aanbeveling was om de infrastructuur te verbeteren en samenwerking tussen 
gezondheidsinstellingen te bevorderen om betere zorg te bereiken in elke regio. 
Ook Arbo-diensten zouden een actievere rol kunnen spelen bij het afhandelen van 
prikaccidenten. 
 
In hoofdstuk 8 werd het effect van de nieuwe richtlijn geëvalueerd aan de hand 
van gegevens van een jaar registratie van het meldpunt in Noordoost-Brabant 
(2005). Alle gegevens werden opnieuw beoordeeld en opnieuw ingedeeld in de 
risico-categorieën die door de nieuwe Nederlandse richtlijn zijn aangegeven. De 
kosten voor preventie van HBV infectie werden berekend voor zowel de oude als 
de nieuwe situatie. Van alle ongevallen konden 83% opnieuw direct in de nieuwe 
categorieën worden ingedeeld. Specifieke medische instrumenten konden vaak 
niet worden ingedeeld. De aanwezigheid van zichtbaar bloed op het instrument 
lijkt dan een logische voorwaarde om een accident in een hoog-risico-categorie te 
kunnen indelen. De nieuwe richtlijn maakt de beoordeling en afhandeling van het 
HBV-risico makkelijker. Er moest in het algemeen minder HBIg worden 
toegediend. Hoewel de gemiddelde kosten van HBV-preventie per accident hoger 
waren, werd dit vooral veroorzaakt door de hogere kosten voor de toediening van 
de HBV-vaccinatie in vergelijking met toediening van HBIg alleen, en de toename 
van het aantal hoog-risico ongevallen. 
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Door gebruik te maken van de nieuwe richtlijn voor prikaccidenten, kunnen 
prikaccidenten eenvoudig in een risico-categorie worden ingedeeld en daarmee 
gestandaardiseerd worden afgehandeld. De risico-categorieën zouden echter meer 
kunnen worden gespecificeerd en ook kunnen meer specificaties worden gegeven 
voor prikaccidenten die niet rechtstreeks kunnen worden ingeschaald. Voor een 
adequate afhandeling van prikaccidenten blijft ervaring in afhandeling belangrijk. 
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NASCHRIFT 
 
Deze pagina is bedoeld om alle mensen te bedanken die mij de afgelopen jaren 
ondersteund en geholpen hebben bij het doen van onderzoek en het maken van dit 
proefschrift. Om te voorkomen dat ik verval in een eindeloze opsomming van 
bedankjes zou ik in een keer iedereen willen bedanken die mij op wat voor manier 
dan ook heeft geholpen en ondersteund. Bij deze. 
Het schrijven van dit proefschrift was geen sinecure. Voor ik hieraan begon had ik 
nog geen idee hoe groot de berg was die voor me lag. En dat is misschien maar 
goed ook anders was er misschien niet overheen gegaan! Dank dus aan al die 
mensen die me ondersteund, weer vlotgetrokken of opgebeurd hebben of er 
simpelweg gewoon waren op de momenten dat ik ze nodig had. 
 
Dankzij het onuitputtelijke en vaak overdonderende enthousiasme van co-
promotor Peter Schneeberger ben ik aan dit proefschrift begonnen, voorzichtig 
met een eerste onderzoek nadat het Noord-Brabantse meldpunt al een jaar lang 
naar tevredenheid functioneerde. Met “boerenkool Engels” werden de eerste 
teksten geschreven, gewist, herschreven, weer gewist enzovoorts. Toen later 
duidelijk werd dat Andreas Voss mijn promotor zou worden werd de lijn van het 
proefschrift uitgestippeld en ik verder ingewijd in de te volgen procedure. 
 
De afdeling Hygiëne en Infectiepreventie moest het ondertussen allemaal maar 
aanzien. Ik denk dat jullie blij zullen zijn dat het allemaal achter de rug is zodat 
jullie niet meer alle verhalen hoeven aan te horen. Toenmalig unithoofd Marianne 
Pelk was een bijzondere stimulans, zij maakte het mogelijk dat ik tijd en energie 
kon investeren, ook al waren er vaak andere acute “hygiënische” zaken aan de 
orde. Mijn collega’s, Maria, Maarten, Marion, Martin, Paul, Fieneke, Leon en 
Wilma, waren het die het meldpunt hebben opgebouwd met hun inzet en kritische 
maar opbouwende opmerkingen. Bij de GGD werd er vanuit de afdeling 
Technische Hygiëne Zorg en Infectieziekten constructief meegedacht.  
 
Ook op andere wijze werd er geholpen: Helma Ruijs met haar vaak nuchtere 
opmerkingen en ondersteunende kritiek bij het schrijven. Greet Boland door alles 
te relativeren op momenten dat ik het allang zelf weer eens had opgegeven. En 
uiteindelijk natuurlijk Kees van Elst met het corrigeren van de teksten en de 
opmaak van het boekje. Fokko die zorgde voor een passende omslag. 
Zonder een stabiel thuisfront was het natuurlijk ook niet gelukt. Kees is er al die 
jaren in blijven geloven en heeft veel aandacht moeten ontberen in de dagen dat ik 
in mijn studeerkamer zat. Hopelijk hebben we weer nu weer veel tijd om met 
elkaar door te brengen. Mijn (schoon)familie heeft ook veel geduld. 
Het zit erop. 
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BIOGRAFIE 
 
De auteur van dit proefschrift werd op 26 februari 1962 te Beesel (Limburg) 
geboren. Hij volgde het middelbaar onderwijs in Roermond (HAVO) waarna hij in 
1980 begon aan de opleiding tot verpleegkundige in Venlo. Deze werd in 1984 in 
het Sint Maartensgasthuis voltooid. Na de opleiding tot verpleegkundige B in 
Castricum, werkte hij van 1986 tot 1995 in het Antonie van Leeuwenhoek 
Ziekenhuis in Amsterdam, eerst als verpleegkundige en later als leidinggevende. 
Tijdens deze periode volgde hij de verpleegkundige vervolgopleiding oncologie en 
de kaderopleiding aan de Hogeschool van Amsterdam. Na deze periode was hij 
achtereenvolgens werkzaam als leidinggevende op de polikliniek oncologie en 
hematologie van het Universitair Medisch Centrum Sint Radboud in Nijmegen en 
unithoofd in het Bosch Medisch Centrum in ’s-Hertogenbosch. In 2001 begon hij 
als ziekenhuishygiënist. Het diploma ziekenhuishygiëne werd hiervoor in 2003 in 
Groningen behaald. Vanaf 2001 werkt hij als projectcoördinator van het Regionaal 
Meldpunt Prikaccidenten in het (inmiddels) Jeroen Bosch Ziekenhuis en als 
hygiënist op de afdeling Technische Hygiënezorg van de GGD Hart voor Brabant. 
In de periode 2006 tot april 2009 was hij daarnaast ook werkzaam als projectleider 
voor het Nationaal Hepatitis Centrum in Amersfoort en volgde hij de Master 
Epidemiologie aan de Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam. 
De auteur is gehuwd met Kees van Wijk en woonachtig te ’s-Hertogenbosch. 
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